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All Work Cultures Discriminate
Deborah M. Weiss*
Men compete with others while women care for them, and from this
fundamental difference flows many dissimilarities in risk-taking,
toughness, and trust. Such generalizations have long been invoked by
traditionalists to explain why women will inevitably be drawn to some jobs
rather than others, and why those jobs will be lower in pay and prestige
than jobs predominantly held by men. This argument was famously
advanced by the defendant in Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC) v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.1: Sears suggested that women were
inherently less interested than men in highly paid commission sales jobs
and preferred lower paid salaried positions.
The Sears case immediately caused a furor and has continued to be a
focal point for debates about women and work. Some feminists believe
that sex differences should be acknowledged and accommodated. They
believe that personality traits relevant to work are differently distributed in
the current male and female population. However, they point out, the
match between personality type and job is determined not only by intrinsic
job characteristics but also by a firm’s work culture. Work cultures are in
part the product of employer choices, conscious or otherwise, and in any
given industry, successful work cultures can vary greatly. Many work
cultures developed when the labor market was dominated by men, and
accommodationists propose that firms be encouraged or required to create
work environments that are more congenial to the personality traits now
common in women. Accommodationists include some scholars who
* Senior Research Affiliate, Searle Center on Law, Regulation, and Economic Growth,
Northwestern University School of Law, and Visiting Scholar, McCombs School of
Business, University of Texas-Austin. This paper has been greatly improved by the
comments of Cary Franklin, Joseph Fishkin, Gregory Mitchell, John Monahan, J. Hoult
Verkerke, Kimberly Yuracko, and participants in University of Virginia School of Law
faculty workshop and the Labor and Employment Law Colloquium at Northwestern
University School of Law and Loyola University Chicago School of Law.
1. The Sears litigation was complex and protracted. The EEOC first began its internal
investigation into Sears in 1973. It filed suit in 1979, and in 1980 the District Court denied
Sears’ motion to dismiss. EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 504 F. Supp. 241, 276 (N.D. Ill.
1980) [hereinafter Sears I]. Commentary on the case frequently examines both the opinion
of the District Court, 628 F. Supp. 1264 (N.D. Ill. 1986) [hereinafter Sears II], the opinion
on appeal by the Seventh Circuit, 839 F.2d 302 (7th Cir. 1988) [hereinafter Sears III], and
the dissent on appeal, Sears III, 839 F.2d at 360 (Cudahy, J., dissenting).
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advocate sex-specific accommodations and others who advocate facially
sex-neutral policies adapted to female-gendered traits.
Many
accommodationists are difference feminists2 who advance an ethic of care
conception of sex differences, thus sharing some common ground with
traditionalists: both agree that men tend towards competitiveness while
women, perhaps because of their role as mothers, strive for connection with
others through care and nurturance.
Other feminist scholars emphasize the importance of resisting
stereotypes. They focus on the costs of accommodation, arguing that
efforts to base policy on any view of long-term sex differences will
ultimately hurt women by bolstering the traditionalist view of sex roles.
The ethic of care model, they argue, reinforces the view that women are
intrinsically less suited than men to resource production and the public
sphere. Workplace segregation, in this view, results primarily from
discrimination that is in some sense intentional, and must be addressed
though antidiscrimination policy, which will integrate workplaces and in
turn solve the problem of work culture.
In this paper I examine the large body of recent empirical evidence on
sex difference and its sometimes surprising results. I argue that this
research points to a revised view of difference that reduces antistereotyping concerns. Both the ethic of care and the traditionalist models
array the masculine and feminine along a single continuum whose ends are
labeled “competitive” and “caring.” They take the traits “competitive” and
“caring” to imply a whole host of other traits such as individualism and
motivation. Yet human personality cannot be described on a single
dimension, and statistical sex differences are similarly richer and more
complex than any one-dimensional theory suggests. The competition/care
dichotomy does seem to describe some observed differences. The average
man does in fact enjoy competitive situations and is stimulated by them to
higher performance. But competitiveness has been inaccurately been
equated with motivation. The average woman is not terribly competitive
but she is ambitious. Women often exert greater effort and respond more
to incentives than do men, and thus their effort is motivated not by the spur
of competition but by self-discipline, conscientiousness, responsiveness to
feedback, and enjoyment of the intrinsic value of a task.
Conversely, caring for others is neither the sole province of women nor
a perfect proxy for all prosocial values. In comparison with the average
man, the average woman does appear more reciprocal of kindness, more
trustworthy and more willing to make sacrifices to avoid inequality.
However, the average man is not wholly self-interested: Compared with the
average woman he is more trusting and more likely to make personal
2. “Difference feminism” is the position that unless sex differences are acknowledged,
“being equal means being like men,” a definition of equality that will disadvantage women.
See, e.g., Carol Gilligan, Getting Civilized, 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 17, 20–21 (1994).

WEISS 4.05.13 1512 (DO NOT DELETE)

Summer 2013]

ALL WORK CULTURES DISCRIMINATE

4/5/2013 6:05 PM

249

sacrifices if those sacrifices would serve utilitarian rather than egalitarian
goals.
The aggregation of these specific empirical findings I will call the
empirical difference model. These research results are sure to be revised
over time but are at present closer to the truth than traditionalism and the
ethic of care model. This relative verisimilitude is, I argue, critical to
balancing the costs of stereotyping against the benefits of accommodation,
a determination central to deciding the role that considerations of
difference should play in public policy. The empirical difference model
tends to support some recognition of difference: It suggests that
accommodation may provide significant benefits, and that stereotyping
costs can be reduced by questioning traditional stereotypes and providing a
more accurate account of sex differences.
The precise form that accommodation should take presents a more
difficult problem. Sex-specific policies, even if based on accurate
generalizations, may reinforce inaccurate views and stigmatize atypical
individuals. Sex-neutral policies may present a reasonable compromise
between sex-specific policies and doing nothing, but do not obviate the
need for an accurate picture of differences. In order to help women, sexneutral accommodation policies must be gender-conscious and based on a
view of the female traits to be accommodated. The empirical difference
model not only provides a more accurate view of what accommodations
would be helpful, but indicates that these accommodations might not be as
costly as they might seem. By making little allowance for female
autonomy and ambition, the ethic of care model points towards work
cultures that would impose enormous costs on employers, especially if
adopted in high prestige jobs. For example, a strong version of the ethic of
care suggests that businesses like Sears would have to all but eliminate
commission sales. The empirical difference model provides a more
complex picture of women who are motivated by incentives but do not
relish conflict. Commission sales work is not inherently uncomfortable for
the average woman, but the highly adversarial atmosphere that Sears
created was.
Unfortunately, gender-conscious but sex-neutral policies have their
own problems. If current sex differences were entirely cultural in origin,
these policies would—along with encouraging women’s aspirations and
reducing discrimination—lead to convergence in the tastes of men and
women and the integration of now-segregated occupations.3 Current
research, however, suggests that in the long run statistical sex differences
are likely to show some persistence, so that workers and firms will be best
3. Vicki Schultz, Telling Stories About Women and Work: Judicial Interpretations of
Sex Segregation in the Workplace in Title VII Cases Raising the Lack of Interest Argument,
103 HARV. L. REV. 1749, 1839 (1989) [hereinafter Schultz, Telling Stories About Women
and Work].
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served by allowing different firms to adopt different practices and attract
employees of both sexes with a congruent personality. Requiring all firms
to adopt a single gender-neutral work culture may impose significant costs
on firms and provide neither the average man nor the average woman with
the optimal work culture. The accommodationist program faces a
quandary. Sex-specific policies are strong medicine that must be sparingly
administered to avoid reinforcing stereotypes or stigmatizing nonconformists.
Leaving today’s workplace governance in place
disadvantages females, because the ground rules developed when males
were the only competitors. Yet gender-conscious neutral policies are at
best equally unfair to both sexes, and seem a poor long-run solution to the
problem of work culture.
No elegant policy design can fully address these complexities: only
messy pragmatic compromises are possible. The simplest step can be taken
in cases in which employers, like Sears, raise the issue of sex differences
when defending claims based on statistical evidence. Plaintiffs have
generally responded by accusing defendants of trafficking in stereotypes,
but this approach has not generally worked well with courts and another
response is possible. Assertions of sameness, I argue, simply end up
measuring women against male norms, a standard by which the average
woman will be found wanting. Rather than deny the existence of sex
differences, plaintiffs might question whether statistical sex differences
take the particular form asserted by defendants, draw a picture of a work
environment in which the average woman would excel, and note that the
defendant chose not to provide this. This approach in turn requires the
empirical difference model or something like it, since the ethic care model
does not readily support plausible work cultures.
A more difficult question is whether defendant’s choice not to provide
a female-friendly environment is itself actionable. Courts will rightly resist
any effort to make them the arbiters of every aspect of work culture. Such
a role is both beyond their institutional competence and disturbingly
authoritarian, since work culture involves social as well as business
relations.4 Challenges to work cultures, I argue, should be considered only
as applied to extreme behavior whose regulation can be justified on more
general grounds. Such claims would be better regarded as a form of
disparate impact than as a form of disparate treatment.
Perhaps the law should place little or no obligation on employers to
accommodate each sex. Voluntary employer efforts thus become critical
and the law must not interfere with voluntary efforts to devise work
cultures that are congenial to women. Such experiments have been made
more difficult by the Supreme Court’s 2009 decision in Ricci v. DeStefano

4. Tristin K. Green, Work Culture and Discrimination, 93 CALIF. L. REV. 623, 625
(2005).
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and I address how a modified affirmative action defense might permit
desirable innovation in work cultures.

I. WORK CULTURES
A firm’s work culture may be defined as the incentives and values that
control the way firm members interact with each other and with outsiders.
An employer’s work culture includes both easily defined characteristics
such as compensation systems and less tangible ones such as the use of
consensus or adversary dispute as a means of reaching decisions. People
with different personalities function best in different work cultures, and
each work culture will tend to attract people whose temperaments are
congruent.
Some means of classifying work cultures would be extremely useful in
examining the claim that different work cultures benefit different
personalities. Unfortunately, culture is an elusive concept in both the study
of society and the study of organizations.5 In the absence of a satisfactory
theoretical framework, I will describe some informal evidence of how work
cultures might have different effects on the average male and female
employee.
A. COMMISSION SALES
1. EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.
Sex discrimination lawsuits can provide case studies on work culture.
Work culture is especially relevant to cases involving the lack of interest
doctrine, in which an employer argues that a job category contains few
women because women find the job unappealing and choose not to apply.6
The policy and doctrinal issues raised by the lack of interest defense will be
discussed in more detail later. For the moment, these cases are useful as

5. Relatively little academic work examines the dimensions along which organizations
are best characterized, and scholars have focused instead on what might be called systems
issues: how cultures emerge, change and are transmitted. This emphasis can be seen by
examining the topics covered in the classic surveys of organizational culture. See EDGAR H.
SCHEIN, ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE AND LEADERSHIP (4th ed. 2010). The most popular
approaches to characterizing the content of cultures develop a typology of organizations
based on one or two especially salient characteristics. This approach has been rightly
criticized as oversimplifying the many dimensions of work culture. Id. at 157. A more
flexible survey approach examines a number of different dimensions, although it still tends
to examine relatively broad constructs. See DANIEL R. DENISON, CORPORATE CULTURE AND
ORGANIZATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS (1990). Unfortunately, the survey approach is not yet
sufficiently developed to provide a framework for examining what personalities thrive in
what cultures, or to provide a basis for systematic empirical work about the prevalence of
different work cultures.
6. The lack of interest defense might in principle be relevant to any case based on
statistical evidence, whether based on disparate impact or disparate treatment theory. See
infra Section V.
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illustrations of the factual characteristics of settings in which sex
differences in personality may be important.
The best known and most controversial lack of interest case is the 1986
EEOC v. Sears Roebuck & Co.7 Sales positions at Sears were compensated
on either a commission or a non-commission basis. The EEOC claimed
that between 1973 and 1980 (the “disputed period”), Sears discriminated
against women in hiring and promotion into commission sales,8 where
compensation was on average much higher than in non-commission sales.9
Even many of us who regard the facts of the Sears case as troubling believe
that the EEOC’s handling of the case was ethically deficient10 and its
theory of liability was less than perfectly clear. In essence, the EEOC
argued that Sears had intentionally excluded women from commission
positions, or alternatively that the subjectivity of its employment practices
facilitated discrimination by individual supervisors.11 Sears responded that
women lacked interest in commission jobs,12 and the EEOC countered that
women were not uninterested but rather discouraged from applying.13 The
EEOC presented evidence of work culture to prove intent, not as a
challenge to the nature of the work culture itself. In this Section, the EEOC
evidence is recounted to examine the work culture in which Sears
conducted its commission selling and how that culture compared with other
retailers.
Throughout the disputed period, Sears made unusually concerted
efforts to improve the position of women in its workforce.14 Employers
frequently employ window dressing to create the appearance of a concern
with diversity, but Sears’ efforts went far beyond this. In the late 1960’s
Sears voluntarily submitted to the demanding affirmative action and
recordkeeping requirements applicable to government contractors.15 The
federal agencies implementing these requirements repeatedly found Sears
to be in compliance with them and regarded Sears’ efforts as a model for
other firms to follow.16 Sears set a long-term goal of representing women
7. See supra note 1.
8. Sears II, 628 F. Supp. 1264, 1278 (N.D. Ill. 1986).
9. Id. at 1289.
10. Judge Cudahy, who dissented in part, stated that “the EEOC’s internal machinations
in initiating this case deserve condemnation.” Sears III, 839 F.2d 302, 360 (7th Cir. 1988)
(Cudahy, J., dissenting).
11. The EEOC relied primarily on a disparate treatment theory. Id. at 312. It made what
the trial court called “vague references” to disparate impact theory. Sears II, 628 F. Supp. at
1279. To the extent that the EEOC did assert a disparate impact claim, that claim was based
on the subjectivity of Sears’ practices rather than its possible masculine bias. Id. at 1281–
85. Since the court found that it had waived its right to assert this theory, evidence of
masculine job typing was relevant primarily to buttress the claim of intent. Id. at 1285 n.7.
12. Sears II, 628 F. Supp. at 1305–15.
13. Id. at 1314.
14. Id. at 1292–94, 1306.
15. Id. at 1292.
16. Id.
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in all company jobs in proportion to their representation in the general
workforce, and it required that managers fill one out of every two new
commission sales positions with women or minorities.17
Sears held local managers accountable by tying compensation to
meeting program goals and disciplining those who made insufficient
efforts.18 As a result, Sears managers actively attempted to persuade
current female employees19 to accept commission selling, sometimes
approaching every woman in the store.20 A female employee who
expressed an interest in commission selling was given priority over male
employees when an opening occurred, and was sometimes guaranteed her
former position if she changed her mind after trying a commission job.21
Despite these unusual efforts, managers had only limited success in
attracting women to commission sales.22 Sears argued, and the trial court
agreed, that women’s lack of interest in commission sales resulted in part
from greater aversion to financial risk.23 Commission jobs did indeed carry
more risk. Non-commission salespeople were compensated on a straight
hourly rate plus 1% commission for full time salespersons. Each week,
commission salespeople received a “draw” of about 70% of estimated
commissions.24 Commissions ranged between 6% and 9%. When
commissions actually earned were below the weekly draw, the salesperson
incurred a deficit that carried over to the next week, although if deficit was
not eliminated by commissions earned in the following week the deficit
would be cleared. After 1977, Sears changed its commission method as
part of its effort to attract more women. Under the new system, the
salesperson earned a salary plus a 3% commission.25 This change

17. Sears II, 628 F. Supp. at 1293.
18. Id.
19. For most of the disputed period, the initial job application form did not ask whether
the applicant was interested in commission or non-commission sales, and some of the
controversy surrounded whether female applicants in fact expressed a serious interest in
commission positions. Id. at 1291.
20. Id. at 1293, 1306.
21. Id. at 1306.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 1307.
24. Id. at 1293–94.
25. Sears III, 839 F.2d 302, 320 (7th Cir. 1988). The summary in text omits two issues
considered in the trial court opinion. First, the court considers the relative reluctance of
women to work long hours, raising at least implicitly the issue of family responsibilities.
Sears II, 628 F. Supp. at 1312. Though an important issue, work-family balance is a
complex problem that is beyond the scope of this article.
Second, the court’s opinion is somewhat confused by repeated mention of the fact that
women were less knowledgeable about and interested in the product lines sold on a
commission basis, such as hard goods and men’s clothing. Id. at 1306. No explanation is
given of how lines were assigned to commission or non-commission sales. To some extent
higher priced items were sold on commission but this does not entirely seem to explain
Sears’ decisions, since men’s clothing was sold on commission while women’s jewelry was
not. Id. I speculate that the choice of compensation method was chosen, perhaps
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coincided with some improvement in the level of women interested in
commission sales.26
Sears also argued that commission sales required personality traits that
women were unlikely to have and behavior that women were unlikely to
enjoy. The central factor in commission hiring was apparently an interview
by a manager that attempted to assess whether the candidate possessed
desired personality traits.27 Of central importance was the candidate’s
“aggressiveness or assertiveness, competitiveness” and “personal
dominance.”28 Sears and the trial court acknowledged but tried to
minimize the importance of two other factors in hiring, a written
description of the requirements for commission selling and several
personality tests.29 However, the general picture of Sears’ goals presented
by these factors was quite consistent with that suggested by the interview.
Like the managerial interview, the written description of a desirable
commission sales candidate stressed the importance of a dominant
personality and “drive and physical vigor.”30 High scores on the
“vigorousness” dimension of the personality tests were considered
desirable and the relevant questions, in addition to a clear male orientation,
equated vigor not simply with energy or even athleticism but with
dominance and aggression, asking “Have you ever done any hunting?” and
“Have you played on a football team?”31 Various studies by Sears’ experts
suggested that women currently employed at Sears lacked interest in
commission selling because such positions involved “‘dog-eat-dog’
competition”32 and “cut-throat competitiveness”33 that interfered with
“friendships at work”34 and the “social and cooperative aspects of the

unconsciously, to match the sex most interested in selling the line. I attach no nefarious
purpose to this, but it makes the relative lack of interest of women in the commission
product lines unsatisfactory as an explanation of why women were not in commission sales.
26. Sears II, 628 F. Supp. at 1309.
27. Id. at 1291.
28. Id. at 1290.
29. Id. at 1290–91. Both the interview criteria and the manual suggested a few factors
not discussed in the text. Whether Sears (or the trial court) believed there were sex
differences in these other characteristics is unclear. The interview criteria included
maturity, the ability to communicate effectively, persuasiveness, an outgoing, social or
extraverted personality, and self-confidence. Id. at 1290. The manual mentioned intellect,
maturity and “the ability to react quickly to a customer’s verbal suggestions and modify the
approach accordingly.” Id.
30. Id. at 1290.
31. Id. at 1300 n.29. The trial court stressed that the vigor criteria was waived for the
purpose of hiring women for commission positions, which, if true may be relevant to the
extent that deliberate intent is alleged. Id. My purpose here, however, is to paint a picture
of the personality for whom this work culture was designed, and for this purpose the
contents of the test and manual seem relevant.
32. Id. at 1307.
33. Id.
34. Id.
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workplace.”35 Sears’ hiring criteria also included a “strong desire to earn a
substantial income”36 and its expert witnesses testified that men were more
likely than women to be motivated by the pay of a job than by the nature of
the job and whether they enjoyed it.37
Another factor given weight was the applicant’s “self-confidence” and
“resilience and the ability to deal with rejection.”38 Hiring decisions were
based on applicant self-evaluation of their skill and experience, and
women’s self-evaluations were lower than men’s.39 Though potential sex
differences in these respects were not discussed in the opinion, Section III
will argue that they play an important role in the workplace.
2. Nordstrom
Nordstrom, a firm whose sales force is about 70% female and whose
top hundred managers are about half female, takes a very different
approach to commission sales.40 The Nordstrom experience shows that
highly successful commission sales personnel can have personalities quite
different from those sought by Sears. Nordstrom’s sales culture is
described in a book written with cooperation from Nordstrom
management.41 While Sears placed a premium on self-confidence,
toughness, and dominance, Nordstrom looks for humility and sensitivity.
“You need to be humble to do service,” said senior executive Erik
Nordstrom. “The moment you think you’re really good at it is when you’re
not really good at it . . . [I]f you’re really sensitive to the customer, and . . .
to the people on the frontline, you are aware of your shortcomings.”42
Nordstrom’s approach is to “hire the smile, train the skill.”43 As current
chairman Bruce Nordstrom put it, “We can hire nice people and teach them
to sell . . . but we can’t hire salespeople and teach them to be nice.”44
Sears used competition as the central mechanism for motivating its
sales force. A competitive environment, it believed, foreclosed cooperation
between sales personnel, and required self-sufficient employees who
needed no external encouragement. In contrast, Nordstrom places great
emphasis on “unselfish” mentoring, mutual encouragement, and
recognizing and praising its sales force. Its philosophy accords with that of
Mary Kay Ash, another famously successful manager of female sales
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

Sears II, 628 F. Supp. at 1308.
Id. at 1290.
Id. at 1308.
Id. at 1290.
Id. at 1322.
ROBERT SPECTOR & PATRICK D. MCCARTHY, THE NORDSTROM WAY TO CUSTOMER
SERVICE EXCELLENCE: A HANDBOOK FOR IMPLEMENTING GREAT SERVICE IN YOUR
ORGANIZATION 100 (2005).
41. Id.
42. Id. at xiv.
43. Id. at 91.
44. Id.
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personnel, who remarked, “There are two things people want more than sex
and money . . . recognition and praise.”45 The contrast between the
Nordstrom and Sears culture is almost comical. Sears motivated
employees by “dog-eat-dog competition,” while Nordstrom managers
inspire employees “by creating an emotional bond with their fellow
employees through a potent blend of praise, recognition, and joy. And
sometimes even tears.”46
Yet for all this warmth and fuzziness, Nordstrom is a very demanding
place to work, and supporters of the Nordstrom way refer to its work
culture as “a process of natural selection—a survival of the fittest that is
purely Darwinian.”47 The entire sales force is on commission and the
typical commission rate is 6.75%,48 within the range of initial Sears’
commissions and above the 3% rate towards the end of the disputed period.
Salespeople are encouraged to set high personal goals for themselves and
data on the sales of other workers are public.49 Nordstrom has been so
successful at motivating its workers that many work long hours off the
clock, writing thank you notes and delivering merchandise to especially
valued customers.50
B. EQUAL OPPORTUNITY ABUSE
Problematic work cultures often do not result in readily identifiable
employment decisions, and are thus prohibited, if at all, under hostile
environment doctrine.51 Discussions of hostile environments often focus
specifically on sexual behavior, one of the few issues for which the
implication of sex differences for employment discrimination has received
detailed consideration. Sexual behavior is not the focus of this article;
Vicki Schultz has argued hostile environments of a nonsexual nature have
received insufficient attention52 and it is these situations that this section
examines.
Many courts have emphasized that Title VII does not prohibit abusive
environments so long as the abuse is meted out on an equal opportunity
basis.53 The conduct in these cases is sometimes quite serious, as
45. SPECTOR & MCCARTHY, supra note 40, at 171.
46. Id. at 173.
47. Id. at 93.
48. Id. at 116.
49. Id. at 178–79.
50. Id. at 103–05.
51. Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 63–67 (1986).
52. Vicki Schultz, The Sanitized Workplace, 112 YALE L.J. 2061, 2172–90 (2002); Vicki
Schultz, Talking About Harassment, 9 J.L. & POL’Y 417 (2000); Vicki Schultz,
Understanding Sexual Harassment Law in Action: What Has Gone Wrong and What We
Can Do About It, 29 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 1, 2–3 (2006).
53. See, e.g., Gross v. Burggraf Constr. Co., 53 F.3d 1531, 1538 (10th Cir. 1995)
(“Accordingly, we must evaluate Gross’ claim of gender discrimination in the context of a
blue collar environment where crude language is commonly used by male and female
employees. Speech that might be offensive or unacceptable in a prep school faculty
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illustrated by the 2005 district court opinion in Flowers v. Honigman Miller
Schwarz & Cohn, LLP. The plaintiff charged that attorney Joseph Polito
had treated her in a degrading and abusive manner and provided supporting
testimony from other female employees.54 One woman recounted that
Polito had “physically grabb[ed] her” and had “chas[ed] her on the
freeway,”55 while a second woman testified that Polito would throw objects
at her and physically hit her. A third reported that Polito would call her a
“worthless piece of shit,” and further testified that Polito would “pluck her
in the back of her head with his finger hard enough to make a thumping
sound.”56 The court denied relief on the grounds that Polito’s treatment of
male employees was equally abusive, but did not provide much factual
detail, and it is hard for a reader to evaluate this conclusion.
Academic discussions of such degrading conduct sometimes suggest
that bullying is primarily a mechanism for enforcing gender norms and that
its targets are generally women and feminine men.57 This conclusion is
inadvertently reinforced by the relatively brief discussion in cases like
Flowers of the treatment by abusers of employees outside the protected
class. Abuse can surely police gender norms. Yet such conduct is also
extremely common among heterosexual men. Men in male-dominated
environments often develop hazing rites that range from relentless teasing
and horseplay to abuse. A classic description of such rituals can be found
in Liar’s Poker, Michael Lewis’s memoir of Salomon Brothers during the
high flying 1980s.58 Lewis describes the experience and behavior of his
class of trainees:
The back row, from about the third day of class on, teetered on the
brink of chaos. Even when they felt merely ambivalent about a
speaker back-row people slept or chucked paper wads at the wimps
in the front row. But if the back-row people for some reason didn’t

meeting, or on the floor of Congress, is tolerated in other work environments.”); Sauers v.
Salt Lake Cnty., 1 F.3d 1122, 1126 (10th Cir. 1993) (“In its findings of fact, the district
court concluded that ‘the work environment at the Investigative Division of the Salt Lake
County Attorney Office was that of an unusually rough, sexually explicit and raw
atmosphere.’”); Reine v. Honeywell Int’l Inc., 362 F. App’x 395, 397 (5th Cir. 2010)
(unpublished), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 140 (2010); Wolff v. Northrop Grumman, 111 F.
App’x 152, 153 (4th Cir. 2004) (unpublished); Flowers v. Honigman Miller Schwarz &
Cohn, LLP, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9062 (E.D. Mich. 2005). Of course, plaintiffs may
prevail if the behavior directed toward protected class members was more severe. Baker v.
John Morrell & Co., 249 F. Supp. 2d 1138, 1152–55 (N.D. Iowa 2003).
54. Flowers, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9062, at *2–3.
55. Id. at *4. The sexually charged harassment has been edited out to emphasize nonsexual abuse.
56. Id. at *14. Again, the text omits sexually charged harassment.
57. See, e.g., Ann C. McGinley, Creating Masculine Identities: Bullying and
Harassment Because of Sex, 79 U. COLO. L. REV. 1151 (2008).
58. See MICHAEL LEWIS, LIAR’S POKER: RISING THROUGH THE WRECKAGE ON WALL
STREET (1989).
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care for a speaker, all hell broke loose.59 . . . [One day] a back row
person had beaned with a paper wad a managing director from
bond market research, who had turned the color of raspberry sorbet
and screamed for five minutes.60
The story is striking in part because the perpetrators were trainees abusing
their trainer, and thus were hardly exploiting a position of authority.
Lewis elaborates on the psychology of work environment. The backrow people, he suggests, “were victims of the myth, especially popular at
Salomon Brothers, that a trader is a savage, and a great trader a great
savage.”61 Many of their superiors lived by this myth: “[l]ife as a Salomon
trainee was like being beaten up every day by the neighborhood bully.”62
After class, the trainees moved from class to the trading floor, “a minefield
of large men with short fuses just waiting to explode if you so much as
breathed in their direction.”63 One day Lewis stepped on one of these
mines:
Me: Hello.
Trader: What fucking rock did you crawl out from under? Hey,
Joe, hey Bob, check out this guy’s suspenders.
Me (reddening): I just wanted to ask you a couple of questions.
Joe: Who the fuck does he think he is?64
The resulting humiliation of Lewis and other trainees was precisely the
point of these interchanges. Still, subordinates were humiliated for a
variety of different reasons. Lewis expresses respect for the harsh Socratic
method, which could motivate hard work, but asks what purpose could be
served by a “trader who threw a phone at your head every other time you
passed his desk?”65
A common pastime was practical jokes, some of which were actually
funny. One poor trader named Matty stole some food from the Salomon
cafeteria and made the mistake of bragging about it.66 The next afternoon
he received a phone call from a man who claimed to be a Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) investigator whose jurisdiction included
Wall Street cafeterias. He was calling, he said, to investigate a theft of
food from the Salomon cafeteria. Matty laughed it off, but the next
morning was confronted by a partner who claimed that he too had been

59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

LEWIS, supra note 58, at 40.
Id. at 55.
Id. at 41.
Id.
Id. at 50.
Id. at 50–51.
Id. at 73.
Id. at 80–83.
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contacted by the SEC about Matty’s food theft and was quite concerned.
He concluded by saying that he really did not know what would happen
next and would get back to Matty. The next morning, Matty, already in a
highly agitated state, was called into the offices of John Gutfreund himself,
who expounded on the seriousness of cheeseburger larceny. Gutfreund
informed him that after a “long and painful meeting” the executive
committee had decided to let him stay “for now.” Matty exited
Gutfreund’s office and sat at his desk, assuming his career was ruined.
After a short time, other traders began to laugh hysterically, driving Matty
out of the building with plans never to return. Of such incidents Lewis
comments, this “cruelty . . . wasn’t personal but ceremonial. Goofs were a
rite of initiation.”67 There are indeed times when abusive behavior is
deliberately targeted towards women because they are women, but
sometimes abuse is simply an aspect of intra-male culture.
Regrettably, no female-dominated financial institution exists to serve
as a comparitor for Salomon as Nordstrom was for Sears, but the contrast
between Nordstrom and Sears suggests that a female-oriented financial
firm would not have a culture of hazing. Wall Street has proven to be one
of the most difficult arenas for women to enter, and high profile suits
against Wall Street firms are common; discomfort with hazing may well
play a role in this.68

II. SEX DIFFERENCES IN PERSONALITY TRAITS
Sears argued that commission sales required personality traits that were
relatively uncommon among women. Both its personnel policies and its
defense of this claim were premised on the idea that a number of diverse
traits are highly correlated. In its view, a successful salesperson needs not
only
financial
motivation
but
aggressiveness,
assertiveness,
competitiveness, self-confidence, and personal dominance. In aggregating
these traits, Sears’ position tracked traditionalist views as well as a
considerable body of difference feminist literature, and indeed a prominent
feminist testified in support of Sears.69
The extensive use of commissions at Nordstrom suggests that these
traits cannot be as strongly associated as Sears claimed. Still, the
differences between female-dominated Nordstrom and male-dominated
Sears and Salomon suggest that some more complex set of sex differences

67. LEWIS, supra note 58, at 80–83.
68. LOUISE MARIE ROTH, SELLING WOMEN SHORT: GENDER AND MONEY ON WALL
STREET 72–74 (2008).
69. The expert, Professor Rosalind Rosenberg, was the object of intense criticism by
other feminists for her testimony, yet the views she expressed were an accurate depiction of
a large body of difference feminist literature. Thomas Haskell & Sanford Levinson,
Academic Freedom and Expert Witnessing: Historians and the Sears Case, 66 TEX. L. REV.
1629, 1649–56 (1987).
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may draw men and women to varying work cultures. This Section attempts
to put that hypothesis on firmer ground by examining several bodies of
research that suggest some correlations between personality and sex.
A. METHODOLOGY
Any study of sex differences in personality inherits general problems in
the study of personality. Social scientists from many different disciplines
study personality, and the terminology is not standard either across
disciplines or among sub-fields within disciplines. The result is both the
jangle fallacy, in which equivalent concepts are not recognized as such,70
and the jingle fallacy, in which a single term is sometimes used to refer to
different phenomena.71
This Section will adopt the taxonomy that has recently developed
among experimental economists, which has had great success in resolving
the apparently inconsistent results of earlier studies. At the same time,
work in other disciplines such as personality psychology has made great
contributions to our understanding72 and will be discussed with the basic
analytic framework of experimental economics.
70. EDWARD L. THORNDIKE, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE THEORY OF MENTAL AND SOCIAL
MEASUREMENTS 10 (1904); Jack Block, A Contrarian View of the Five-Factor Approach to
Personality Description, 117 PSYCHOL. BULL. 187, 209 (1995) [hereinafter Block,
Contrarian View].
71. T.L. KELLEY, INTERPRETATION OF EDUCATIONAL MEASUREMENTS 64 (1927); Block,
Contrarian View, supra note 70.
72. While economists tend to focus on beliefs and behaviors, psychologists usually
examine traits. Personality traits are “enduring patterns of perceiving, relating to, and
thinking about the environment and oneself that are exhibited in a wide range of social and
personal contexts.” AMER. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC & STATISTICAL MANUAL OF
MENTAL DISORDERS 826 (4th ed. 2000). Traits are not themselves behaviors but are
believed to predict behavior. The most commonly used framework for analyzing traits is
the Big Five factor classification. Several separate research groups using slightly different
methods arrived at five similar but not identical factors that can be further broken down into
subclasses usually called facets. OLIVER P. JOHN & SANJAY SRIVASTAVA, The Big-Five Trait
Taxonomy: History, Measurement, and Theoretical Perspectives, in HANDBOOK OF
PERSONALITY: THEORY AND RESEARCH 102–11 (Oliver P. John and Lawrence A. Pervin,
eds., 2nd ed. 1999); Paul T. Costa, Jr. & Robert R. McCrae, The Revised NEO Personality
Inventory (NEO-PI-R), in [2 PERSONALITY MEASUREMENT AND TESTING] THE SAGE
HANDBOOK OF PERSONALITY THEORY AND ASSESSMENT 179 (Gregory J. Boyle et al., eds.,
2008); John M. Digman, Personality Structure: Emergence of the Five-Factor Model, 41
ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 417 (1990). Although the Big Five has proven useful in a wide variety
of settings, it has drawbacks. The terminology for both factors and facets is not consistent
among different versions of the Big Five and researchers disagree about how many traits lie
outside the Big Five. Sampo V. Paunonen & Douglas N. Jackson, What Is Beyond the Big
Five? Plenty!, 68 J. PERSONALITY 821 (2000); Kibeom Lee & Michael C. Ashton,
Psychometric Properties of the HEXACO Personality Inventory, 39 MULTIVARIATE
BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH 329, 331 (2004); Kibeom Lee et al., Personality Traits Beyond the
Big Five: Are They Within the HEXACO Space?, 73 J. PERSONALITY 1437 (2005).
Researchers also disagree about whether the data supports five factors rather than some
other number. Jack Block, Millennial Contrarianism: The Five-Factor Approach to
Personality Description 5 Years Later, 35 J. RESEARCH IN PERSONALITY 98 (2001). Some of
the most contested issues involve traits that are critical in analyzing sex differences, such as
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The experimental economics literature adopts the standard economic
distinction between preferences and opportunities, and draws on the
behavioral economics literature that considers limitations on rationality.
Preferences are divided into social preferences, which concern other
people, and self-regarding preferences, which concern our goals for
ourselves. An important contribution of the new experimental work has
been to bring some order into the previously confusing taxonomy of social
preferences, to which we now turn.
B. SOCIAL CHOICES
1. Social Preferences
When an individual’s well-being depends on the well-being of others,
that individual is said to exhibit a social or other-regarding preference.
Most of the debate over sex differences in personality concerns social
preferences.73 Both traditionalists and difference feminists often suggest
that men focus on competing with others, while women focus on caring for
them.
The new literature on social preferences distinguishes between
preferences that are conditional and those that are unconditional.74
Distributive preferences such as altruism and inequality aversion are
independent of the actions of other people, or unconditional.75 In contrast,
a conditional social preference depends on the actual or anticipated actions

“impulsiveness.” JOHN & SRIVASTAVA, supra, at 122. The factor “extraversion” is
generally defined to include sociability, assertiveness, positive emotions and warmth.
Aggregate sex differences in this category are probably not meaningful since its factors have
strongly opposing gender effects. Women score higher in warmth, sociability, and positive
emotions while men score higher in assertiveness. Paul T. Costa, Jr. et al., Gender
Differences in Personality Traits Across Cultures: Robust and Surprising Findings, 81 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 322, 326 (2001) [hereinafter Costa, Jr. et al., Gender
Differences]. Trait analysis no doubt has important contributions to make to the
understanding of sex differences, but those contributions must either be grounded on facet
level analysis, not usually the practice now, or some more satisfactory factor level
classification.
73. For excellent surveys, see Rachel Croson & Uri Gneezy, Gender Differences in
Preferences, 47 J. ECON. LITERATURE 448 (2009); CATHERINE C. ECKEL & PHILIP J.
GROSSMAN, Men, Women and Risk Aversion: Experimental Evidence, in 1 HANDBOOK OF
EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS RESULTS 510 (Charles R. Plott & Vernon L. Smith eds., 2008)
[hereinafter ECKEL & GROSSMAN, Experimental Evidence].
74. In most of the well-known games usually used in laboratory experiments, an
individual behavior depends on more than one of these traits. The multiplicity of traits at
work, in combination with nonstandardized terminology, make interpretation and crossexperimental comparison difficult at best. However, one test, the dictator game, is relatively
simple and depends only on unconditional preferences. By administering to each subject
both the dictator game and a more complex game, the researcher can draw inferences about
individual traits that would be obscured in the more complex games separately. James C.
Cox, How To Identify Trust and Reciprocity, 46 GAMES & ECON. BEHAV. 260 (2004). The
details of these inferences are described infra notes 80 and 83.
75. Id. at 262–63.
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of others.76 The most important of the conditional social preferences are
trust, trustworthiness, and retributiveness.
For many years, studies of sex differences in distributive preferences
found apparently inconsistent results, with women sometimes giving more
and men sometimes giving more. These inconsistencies seem to be
explained by a pattern reported by Andreoni and Vesterlund.77 Women are
more inequality-averse than men, even at a large personal cost or when
equality decreases the size of the social pie.78 Men are more utilitarian. If
giving a small amount will greatly benefit the other party, so that altruism
is inexpensive, men tend to give more than women.79
Studies of conditional preferences also produced results that initially
seemed inconsistent with each other, but which now have been explained
by improved classifications and experimental methods. If my kind actions
are driven by the assumption that you will treat me well in return, I am
trusting.80 In general, men are more trusting than women, although the

76. Cox, supra note 75, at 262–63.
77. James Andreoni & Lise Vesterlund, Which Is the Fair Sex? Gender Differences in
Altruism, 116 Q.J. ECON. 293 (2001). Andreoni and Vesterlund used the dictator game, in
which the proposer is given an amount of money to divide between himself and the recipient
and the recipient must accept the offer. The game thus examines the distributive
preferences of the proposer. A purely self-interested proposer would allocate nothing to the
recipient. In fact, many proposers do allocate some money to the recipient. Proposer
decisions can be caused by inequality aversion or altruism, but not by conditional
preferences. Id. at 295–96.
78. Id. at 303.
79. Id. This result is consistent with earlier studies showing women more generous at
the price predicted by Andreoni and Vesterlund. Id. at 304–05 (citing Catherine C. Eckel &
Philip J. Grossman, Are Women Less Selfish Than Men?: Evidence from Dictator
Experiments, 108 ECON. J. 726 (1998)). Women and men also respond differently to
variations in the basic dictator game. Women are more inequality averse and men more
utilitarian when they allocate resources between other players. David L. Dickinson & Jill
Tiefenthaler, What Is Fair? Experimental Evidence, 69 SOUTHERN ECON. J. 414, 423 (2002).
Women give less weight than men to whether resources are “earned,” id. at 424, and women
are more likely to insure other people against losses. Reinhard Selten & Axel Ocekenfels,
An Experimental Solidarity Game, 34 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 517, 529 (1998). However,
some circumstances reduce sex differences: these differences are lower in face-to-face
rather than anonymous situations. Gary E. Bolton & Elena Katok, An Experimental Test for
Gender Differences in Beneficent Behavior, 48 ECON. LETTERS 287 (1995) (imperfect
anonymity, no sex difference in giving); Martin Dufwenberg & Astri Muren, Generosity,
Anonymity, Gender, 61 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 42, 45 (2006) (almost no anonymity, no
sex difference in aggregate donations though more women give something).
80. Cox, supra note 74, at 263. In trust games, player one chooses how much of his
endowment to allocate to player two. The amount sent is multiplied by some fixed number
and received by player two. Player two then decides how much money to return to player
one. The amount sent by player one is determined by a combination of altruism, inequality
aversion, trust, and fear of negative reciprocity. The amount returned is determined by a
combination of positive reciprocity and altruism. An experiment that combines a trust game
with dictator games (which depend only on altruism and inequality aversion) allows
estimation of player one's degree of trust and player two's positive reciprocity. Id. at 262–
63. The differences in the individual’s behavior as dictator and trust-proposer provide a
measure of trust, while the difference between behavior as dictator and trust-respondent
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differences vary with circumstances and diminish as more information
about the other party is made available.81 If I repay kind actions with my
own kindness, I am trustworthy, or positively reciprocal.82 If I respond to
unkind actions with more unkind actions, I am retributive or negatively
reciprocal.83 Women appear to be more reciprocal than men: they are
usually more trustworthy, rewarding generosity more than men do, and
they are also more negatively reciprocal, punishing stinginess more.84
However, the degree of women’s reciprocity seems to vary more with
context than does that of men. One study found that women’s positive
reciprocity falls with the price of reciprocity and with their social distance
from the recipient, and at high levels of social distance and price men are
more generous.85
2. Competition
A situation is said to be competitive if it is zero-sum, so that an
outcome that is beneficial to one participant is detrimental to others.86 An
individual may enter a competitive situation to advance goals such as
financial gain that could be satisfied in ways other than engaging in
competition. Although a clear terminology has not fully developed, I will

provides a measure of positive reciprocity. James C. Cox & Cary A. Deck, On the Nature
of Reciprocal Motives, 43 ECON. INQUIRY 623, 623, 625, 629–30 (2005) [hereinafter Cox &
Deck, Reciprocal Motives].
81. Croson & Gneezy, supra note 73, at 458–60.
82. Cox & Deck, Reciprocal Motives, supra note 80, at 623. For experimental methods
that estimate positive reciprocity, see supra note 80.
83. In an ultimatum game the proposer suggests an allocation of a given sum of money.
The responder may accept the allocation, or reject the offer, leaving each party with zero.
The amount sent results from inequality-aversion, altruism, or fear of negative reciprocity.
Second movers may veto such proposals because of inequality-aversion or because of
negative reciprocity. By combining ultimatum games with dictator games, which depend
only on altruism and inequality aversion, the second movers’ degree of negative reciprocity
can be estimated. Cox & Deck, Reciprocal Motives, supra note 80, at 623.
84. Catherine C. Eckel & Philip J. Grossman, The Relative Price of Fairness: Gender
Differences in a Punishment Game, 30 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 143, 151–54 (1996). See
generally Croson & Gneezy, supra note 73, at 460–61 (surveying literature). One study
distinguished between specific reciprocity, in which a subject rewards a particular individual
who acted generously towards the subject, and general reciprocity, in which subjects
respond to generous treatment by generosity towards third parties. Avner Ben-Ner et al.,
Reciprocity in a Two-Part Dictator Game, 53 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 333, 350 (2004).
Specific reciprocity is associated with the personality traits agreeableness and neuroticism,
which are more common in women, David P. Schmitt et al., Why Can’t a Man Be More Like
a Woman? Sex Differences in Big Five Personality Traits Across 55 Cultures, 94 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 168, 172 (2008), but no gender effects after controlling for
these traits. Ben-Ner et al., supra, at 349. Women show more general reciprocity even after
controlling for personality traits. Id. at 349–50.
85. James C. Cox & Cary A. Deck, When Are Women More Generous than Men?, 44
ECON. INQUIRY 587, 595–96 (2006).
86. See, e.g., MARTIN J. OSBORNE & ARIEL RUBINSTEIN, A COURSE IN GAME THEORY 21
(1994).
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reserve the term “competitiveness” to refer to the enjoyment derived from
participation in competitive situations wholly apart from any gain obtained.
Two important sex differences emerge with respect to competition.
First, competitive settings generally increase the performance of males but
not of females.87 This conclusion is somewhat sensitive to environmental
conditions. Second, men are far more likely than women to choose to
engage in competition. One study examined a task chosen so that males
and females performed on average equally under a noncompetitive piece
rate scheme.88 All subjects participated in a piece rate task and then in a
tournament, in each case receiving only information on their absolute rather
than their relative performance. Participants were then allowed to select
whether to repeat the task in the piece rate setting or in the competitive
tournament setting. While 73% of the men selected the tournament, only
35% of the women made this choice.89 At least some members of each sex
made choices that seem suboptimal from a strictly financial point of view.
High ability women who performed well in the initial rounds chose a piece
rate scheme when they would have done better in a tournament, and low
ability men chose the tournament even when they would have done better
under the piece rate.90 Risk and feedback aversion explained only a small
part of this difference, which appears to be caused by male overconfidence
and greater preference for competition.91 In other words, the males
appeared to enjoy the competition itself, regardless of its financial rewards,
while the females conversely disliked the competition even when they
would have done well.
3. Aggression
Aggression is often defined as an act that harms others.92 The harm
can be gratuitous or it can be instrumental.93 Ideally the study of
aggression would be integrated into the conceptual framework used in the
preceding sections, but at the moment it constitutes an entirely separate
body of research. The studies of social preferences just described were
conducted in the laboratory by psychologists and economists, but ethical
considerations limit the experimental study of aggression. Aggression
research thus often consists of field studies conducted by researchers in
87. Uri Gneezy et al., Performance in Competitive Environments: Gender Differences,
118 Q.J. ECON. 1049 (2003); Uri Gneezy & Aldo Rustichini, Gender and Competition at a
Young Age, 94 AM. ECON. REV. 377 (2004).
88. Muriel Niederle & Lise Vesterlund, Do Women Shy Away from Competition? Do
Men Compete Too Much?, 122 Q.J. ECON. 1067, 1078, 1097 (2007).
89. Id. at 1069.
90. Id. at 1069–70.
91. Niederle & Vesterlund, supra note 88.
92. John Archer & Sarah M. Coyne, An Integrated Review of Indirect, Relational, and
Social Aggression, 9 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. REV. 212, 212 (2005).
93. Seymour Feshbach, The Function of Aggression and the Regulation of Aggressive
Drive, 71 PSYCHOL. REV. 257 (1964).
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ethology, anthropology, sociology, and evolutionary psychology. Despite
the complications of comparing this work with lab studies, aggression is of
tremendous importance to work culture, and so I summarize aggression
research without attempting to make it fully commensurate with
experimental work.
Aggression can be direct or indirect. Direct aggression can be either
physical or verbal, but must involve an open confrontation with the
intended victim. “Indirect” aggression is covert and is generally a
“relational” or “social” attempt to ostracize the intended victim.94 Research
uniformly shows that physical aggression is dramatically more common
among males than females, with the difference varying across age groups
and peaking in late teens to early twenties.95 This pattern shows strong
cross-cultural consistency. Some studies show no difference in toddlers but
the trend in recent research indicates a small difference at very young
ages.96 Direct verbal aggression is also more common among males than
females, though the gap is smaller than for physical aggression,97 and no
strong age patterns have emerged. Indirect aggression displays a complex
pattern that varies with the context and type of measurement. Sex
differences appear to change with age, and females seem to use more
indirect aggression than males in later childhood and adolescence.98
Several factors seem to contribute to the greater aggressiveness of males.
Both sexes experience approximately equal frequency and intensity of
anger.99 However, women may have a greater ability to control aggressive
impulses.100 In addition, men and women assess differently the costs and
benefits of aggression. For all forms of aggression, provocation increases
female aggression and sharply reduces sex differences,101 possibly because
the other party is already antagonistic, lowering female assessment of the
costs of aggression.
Women show markedly more aggression in
experimental than field studies, possibly because of the greater retaliation

94. Archer & Coyne, supra note 92, at 225–26 (indirect, social, and relational all
measure essentially same phenomenon).
95. John Archer, Sex Differences in Aggression in Real-World Settings: A Meta-Analytic
Review, 8 REV. GEN. PSYCHOL. 291, 310–11 (2004); Margo Wilson & Martin Daly,
Competitiveness, Risk Taking, and Violence: The Young Male Syndrome, 6 ETHOLOGY &
SOCIOBIOLOGY 59 (1985).
96. Archer, supra note 95, at 310–11.
97. Id.
98. Nicole H. Hess & Edward H. Hagen, Sex Differences in Indirect Aggression
Psychological Evidence from Young Adults, 27 EVOLUTION & HUM. BEHAV. 231 (2006).
See generally Archer, supra note 95, at 308–09.
99. Archer, supra note 95, at 308–09.
100. Daniel Strüber, Sex, Aggression and Impulse Control: An Integrative Account, 14
NEUROCASE 1 (2008).
101. B. Ann Bettencourt & N. Miller, Gender Differences in Aggression as a Function of
Provocation: A Meta-analysis, 119 PSYCHOL. BULL. 422 (1996).
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costs in real world situations.102 Female preference for indirect aggression
may result from the perceived lower likelihood of retaliation.103
C. SELF-REGARDING PREFERENCES
Self-regarding preferences are those than concern an individual’s wellbeing apart from any interest taken in the welfare of others. This Section
examines recent studies that suggest some statistical sex differences in
these self-regarding preferences.
1. Risk Preferences
Studies by psychologists and sociologists examine a wide range of
risky behaviors, from smoking to intellectual risk. These studies suggest
that men are more risk-taking than women, although the degree of
difference is somewhat task and context dependent.104
Sex differences in risk-taking are partly explained by differences in risk
perception. Studies differ about the extent to which different risk
preferences are observed after taking perception into account. Women
appear to be more risk-averse than men in abstract gambles with clearly
stipulated stakes, in which differences in risk perception should in theory
be irrelevant.105 In contextual studies where subjects must assess risk, the
results are more mixed. They suggest that sex differences in risk aversion
vary with context, but account for a smaller proportion of differences in
risk-taking than differences in risk assessment.106
A final component of risk-taking behavior is the taste for risk,
analogous to the taste for competition.107 In the traditional economic
model, rational agents do not enjoy either competitive or risky situations as
such, but are willing to enter them to gain the rewards they may bring.
However, just as some people enjoy the experience of competition, some
enjoy the experience of taking risks, a trait sometimes referred to as
“sensation seeking.”108 Evidence shows that males are on average
significantly more sensation-seeking than females, a difference which may
explain a considerable part of greater real world risk-taking by males.109

102. Bettencourt and Miller, supra note 101, at 443.
103. Archer & Coyne, supra note 92, at 220.
104. James P. Byrnes et al., Gender Differences in Risk-Taking: A Meta-Analysis, 125
PSYCHOL. BULL. 367, 377 (1999).
105. ECKEL & GROSSMAN, Experimental Evidence, supra note 73.
106. E.U. Weber et al., A Domain-Specific Risk-Attitude Scale: Measuring Risk
Perceptions and Risk Behaviors, 15 J. BEHAV. DECISION MAKING 263, 282 (2002).
107. See supra Section II.B.2.
108. C.P. Cross et al., Sex Differences in Impulsivity: A Meta-Analysis, 137 PSYCHOL.
BULL. 97, 98 (2011).
109. Id. at 98, 122.
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2. Delay of Gratification
“Conscientiousness” is a tendency to plan, show self-discipline, control
impulses, and aim for achievement. Studies that examine broad measures
of conscientiousness sometimes, but not always, show somewhat higher
levels of conscientiousness in women.110
Studies using more finely differentiated categories tend to find a female
advantage. One meta-analysis of studies of children found girls stronger in
several measures of “effortful control,” the ability to manage and regulate
attention and inhibit their impulses,111 though studies of adults indicate that
sex difference may diminish with age.112 Another study found a large
female edge in self-discipline,113 and there is some evidence that females
are motivated more by intrinsic enjoyment and less by external rewards
than are males.114
Individual studies of delay of gratification seemed to produce a mixed
picture, though a meta-analysis suggested that women have a small but
highly significant advantage.115 One study with over two hundred
participants found that many of the males and not a single woman made
time-inconsistent decisions.116 This result may explain the confusing
results of earlier studies, since time inconsistency implies that the relative
patience of men and women depends on the time horizon under study.

110. Schmitt et al., supra note 84. No significant difference was found in Costa, Jr. et al.,
Gender Differences, supra note 72 (new data using NEO-PR-I). See also Alan Feingold,
Gender Differences in Personality: A Meta-Analysis, 116 PSYCHOL. BULL. 429, 442 (1994)
(meta-analysis of studies from a wide variety of frameworks, showing no sex differences in
the broadly-defined category of “impulsiveness,” which aggregated all traits labeled
impulsiveness, self-control, restraint and cautiousness); Cross et al., supra note 108, at 119
(small difference in aggregate measures).
111. Nicole M. Else-Quest et al., Gender Differences in Temperament: A Meta-Analysis,
132 PSYCHOL. BULL. 33, 60–61 (2006).
112. One meta-analysis of adults found a small female advantage in “effortful control” in
emotionally charged situations but no sex difference in “executive function.” Cross et al.,
supra note 108, at 119–22.
113. Angela Lee Duckworth & Martin E.P. Seligman, Self-Discipline Gives Girls the
Edge: Gender in Self-Discipline, Grades, and Achievement Test Scores, 98 J. EDUC.
PSYCHOL. 198 (2006).
114. Catherine F. Ratelle et al., Autonomous, Controlled, and Amotivated Types of
Academic Motivation: A Person-Oriented Analysis, 99 J. EDUC. PSYCHOL. 734, 737 (2007);
Katrin Bätz et al., Differences Between Boys and Girls in Extracurricular Learning Settings,
5 INT’L J. ENVTL. & SCI. EDUC. 14 (2010).
115. Irwin W. Silverman, Gender Differences in Delay of Gratification: A Meta-Analysis,
49 SEX ROLES 451 (2003).
116. Jeffrey Prince & Daniel L. Shawhan, Is Time Inconsistency Primarily a Male
Problem?, APP. ECON. LETTERS 501 (2011).
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D. COGNITIVE DIFFERENCES
1. Self-Evaluation
On average, men are substantially more self-confident than women.117
This finding of course raises the question of the accuracy of each group’s
self-perception. Most research suggests that both men and women tend to
be overconfident118 but men more so.119 Overconfidence may take a
number of forms that show little correlation,120 but men exceed women on
all. Men are more likely to overestimate their own accuracy in comparison
to true values (miscalibrate); to overestimate their own accuracy relative to
that of other people (the better-than-average effect); and to believe they
exercise more control over events than they do (illusion of control).121
These findings are especially pronounced in masculine-typed tasks.122
Women and men are equally likely to change their self-evaluation in
response to unambiguous feedback. Women are more likely than men to
change their self-evaluation in response to ambiguous or noisy feedback,
regardless of whether the feedback is positive or negative, and show
symmetric responses to positive or negative feedback. Men’s selfevaluation responds positively to positive feedback and little or even
positively to negative feedback.123
A related phenomenon is self-handicapping, the creation or claiming of
obstacles to successful performance in order to blame subsequent failure on
the handicap. Claimed self-handicapping shows no sex differences.

117. A survey of the literature can be found in Mary A. Lundeberg & Paul W. Fox,
Highly Confident but Wrong: Gender Differences and Similarities in Confidence Judgments,
86 J. EDUC. PSYCHOL. 114 (1994).
118. However, on very difficult tasks both sexes believe that they perform worse than
they actually do. Don A. Moore & Deborah A. Small, Error and Bias in Comparative
Judgment: On Being Both Better and Worse than We Think We Are, 92 J. PERSONALITY &
SOC. PSYCHOL. 972, 972 (2007).
119. Sylvia Beyer & Edward M. Bowden, Gender Differences in Self-Perceptions:
Convergent Evidence from Three Measures of Accuracy and Bias, 23 PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. BULL. 157 (1997) [hereinafter Beyer & Bowden, Gender Differences in SelfPerceptions]; Sylvia Beyer, Gender Differences in the Accuracy of Self-Evaluations of
Performance, 59 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 960, 966 (1990) [hereinafter Beyer,
Accuracy of Self-Evaluations].
120. Markus Glaser & Martin Weber, Overconfidence and Trading Volume, 32 GENEVA
RISK & INS. REV. 1, 29–31 (2007).
121. Lundeberg & Fox, supra note 117; S. Lichtenstein et al., Calibration of Subjective
Probabilities: The State of the Art up to 1980, JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS
AND BIASES 306 (1982); Beyer, Accuracy of Self-Evaluations, supra note 119; Beyer &
Bowden, Gender Differences in Self-Perceptions, supra note 119.
122. Beyer, Accuracy of Self-Evaluations, supra note 119; Beyer & Bowden, Gender
Differences in Self-Perceptions, supra note 119. One study found male overconfidence on
the typically female task of social skills. K.V. Petrides & Adrian Furnham, Gender
Differences in Measured and Self-Estimated Trait Emotional Intelligence, 42 SEX ROLES
449, 458 (2000).
123. Tomi-Ann Roberts & Susan Nolen-Hoeksema, Sex Differences in Reactions to
Evaluative Feedback, 21 SEX ROLES 725, 741 (1989).
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However, women engage in far less behavioral self-handicapping, or the
actual creation of obstacles, and judge such behavior more harshly in
others.
2. Risk-Perception
Higher levels of male risk-taking were initially attributed to greater
male preference for risk. However, risk-taking is a function of both risk
assessment and risk preferences, and recent studies find that a considerable
amount of the difference in risk-taking occurs because females rate risk
levels higher than males.124 The magnitude of the sex difference may vary
with the context, but the overall pattern of difference seems strong.
Unfortunately, relatively few studies examine which of the two approaches
leads to more accurate assessment of risk: Do men underestimate risk more
than women overestimate it? Some evidence suggests that males are better
forecasters of risks that do not involve self-assessment,125 while women are
better at forecasting the extent to which they can control risk.126
E. SUMMARY
At the present time, men and women exhibit significant differences in
personality. To some extent those differences are consistent with the
assertion that men are more competitive than women. Men indeed seem far
more likely than women to enjoy competition as an end in itself. However,
research does not support the view that competition is highly correlated
with motivation and ambition. Women respond strongly to individualistic
incentives.
On average, women are more self-disciplined and
conscientious than men, and are more likely to be motivated by the intrinsic
value of a task. The normative value sometimes assigned to traits more
often found in men may also be debated. Men are in fact more confident
than women, and in part for this reason, are more inclined to take risks.
However, their self-estimates are often contradicted by evidence, and the
wisdom of the risks undertaken because of excessive self-confidence may
be questioned.
Conversely, women have no monopoly on social virtue. On average,
women are more willing than men to sacrifice their own interests to reduce
inequality. Women are also more trustworthy in the sense that they
reciprocate acts of kindness. Men, however, are more trusting and more
willing to make sacrifices that increase overall social well-being but do not

124. Loretta M. Hillier & Barbara Morrongiello, Age and Gender Differences in SchoolAge Children’s Appraisals of Injury Risk, 23 J. PEDIATRIC PSYCHOL. 229, 235 (1998).
125. Donald Vandegrift & Paul Brown, Gender Differences in the Use of High-Variance
Strategies in Tournament Competition, 34 J. SOCIO-ECON. 834, 843–44 (2005).
126. Brad M. Barber & Terrance Odean, Boys Will Be Boys: Gender, Overconfidence,
and Common Stock Investment, 116 Q.J. ECON. 261, 288–89 (2001). For evidence of the
general connection between overconfidence and excess trading, see Meir Statman et al.,
Investor Overconfidence and Trading Volume, 19 REV. FIN. STUD. 1531 (2006).
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decrease inequality. One sex difference is ambiguous in its normative
implications: women are more likely to respond negatively to an act that
hurts them. The social value of retribution is much debated: my own view
is that it is sometimes destructive but sometimes a necessary evil that
increases social cohesion.
Last but not least, we must try to resist the temptation that many of us
feel to bend the results to various agendas. For example, though I find
myself inclined to regard male overconfidence in a negative light, research
consistently shows that depressed individuals have a far more realistic selfimage that non-depressed individuals, and irrational self-confidence seems
to have distinct mental health advantages.127 Confronted with evidence of
each other’s tastes, both men and women are likely to feel some
impatience. Men may feel that women need to toughen up and stop being
so sensitive. Women may find men’s antics childish, and wonder why they
need competition as a substitute for self-discipline. Both, I hope, will
suppress these impulses. Neither set of motivational mechanisms is
inherently better than the other, and both should be accepted with a
minimum of judgment.

III. PERSONALITY IN WORK CULTURES
Just as personality traits cannot be arrayed along a single dimension,
neither can work cultures. Employers can invest their work cultures with a
wide variety of attributes that will have different effects on workers with
different personalities and thus different effects on the average man and the
average woman. No single work culture is uniquely optimal for inducing
high performance and the personnel literature reinforces a central message
of the previous section: competition as such is not a critical element of all
successful work cultures.
A. PERSONNEL ECONOMICS
The central problem of personnel management is the inability of firms
to observe perfectly either how hard employees work or their basic
abilities.128 Employers have two ways to address the problem of imperfect
information: They can invest in evaluating worker performance or they can
create incentives for effort by performance compensation such as the
commissions at issue in Sears. The best combination of monitoring and
incentives varies with the characteristics of the employee, and if those
characteristics vary statistically by sex then the ideal employer policy will
not be the same for the average woman and the average man.

127. Peter M. Lewinsohn et al., Social Competence and Depression: The Role of Illusory
Self-Perceptions, 89 J. ABNORMAL PSYCHOL. 203, 210, 212 (1980).
128. Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and
Economic Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 777, 780 (1972).
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1. Monitoring Versus Incentives
Supervisors can observe a certain amount of information about
employee performance without any special expenditure. Investing in
personnel methods can improve the quality of performance information,
although the cost of obtaining perfect information is generally prohibitive.
Monitoring allows the employer to discharge poor workers,129 and an
employer that expends little effort to obtain information runs the risk of
attracting workers who shirk.130
Most employers will therefore attempt to improve their information
about workers through performance evaluation. With perfect agreement
between employee and employer, an employment relationship based on
performance evaluation can be satisfactory to both parties. However, the
difficulty of accurate performance measurement may lead to
disagreements, leading the employment relationship to break down.131
Employees who feel unappreciated may become demoralized and resentful,
leading them to reduce their productivity or quit and thus destroying any
employer investment in their training.
Even with initially diverging views, performance evaluation may be
useful if employers and employees each change their assessment of the
employee’s performance after hearing input from the other side.132 In real
workplaces, mutual improvements in assessment are an important goal of
employment evaluations, which are intended not only to reward past
performance but to improve future performance. However, employer and
employee evaluations will tend to converge only if worker self-assessments
are not systematically biased and workers update those assessments based
on employer input.
To avoid the problem of disagreement, employers may choose a
relatively objective measure of performance such as sales, and use that
measure as the basis of incentive compensation. Incentive contracts can be
classified as individualistic or relative. Individualistic incentive contracts
are based solely on the output of the individual worker and include sales

129. Although monitoring and discharge are obviously options, the principal agency
literature has typically treated compensation as the principal incentive mechanism available
to the employer and monitoring mechanisms have not received the attention they deserve.
Jeffrey S. Banks & Rangarajan K. Sundaram, Optimal Retention in Agency Problems, 82 J.
ECON. THEORY 293, 293–94 (1998).
130. This parallels the important observation of Edward Lazear that hawks will not selfsort away from dove firms but doves will self-sort away from hawk firms. Edward P.
Lazear, Pay Equality and Industrial Politics, 97 J. POL. ECON. 561, 571 (1989).
131. W. Bentley MacLeod & James M. Malcomson, Implicit Contracts, Incentive
Compatibility, and Involuntary Unemployment, 57 ECONOMETRICA 447, 448 (1989); Clive
Bull, The Existence of Self-Enforcing Implicit Contracts, 102 Q.J. ECON. 147, 156–57
(1987). For present purposes, it is not important whether the relationship breaks down by a
lawsuit, a quit or discharge, or by failure of cooperation in an ongoing relationship.
132. The formal models of personnel economics have not to date examined this
possibility.
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commissions and piece rates, in which workers are paid a fixed amount for
each piece of output they produce.133 A relative compensation scheme,
sometimes called a competitive scheme, bases wages on performance in
comparison to other workers.134 In real world employment, relative
compensation schemes are especially common in the promotion rather than
the pure compensation setting: Job hierarchies may be arranged so that a
group of employees knows that only one winner can be promoted to the
next level.
All incentive schemes improve effort, but they inefficiently shift the
risks of production away from risk-averse firms and towards risk-averse
workers who require a risk premium in the form of higher wages.135
Relative compensation schemes can serve a purpose by screening out
production risks common to all workers,136 but often production risks can
be more effectively netted out by using measures such as overall firm
performance that do not rely on comparisons with other workers.
Perhaps the most surprising result of the literature on relative
compensation is that the self-interested worker is motivated only by
absolute earnings. Relative earnings are of use only in the information they
provide to the employer, and competition has no intrinsic motivational

133. Alternatively, workers may be paid a rate based on output that increases or declines
as output rises; they may be required to meet a specified quota; or they may be paid some
complex combination of these schemes. If the worker’s only choices are the amount of
labor to supply and the amount of effort to exert, labor contracts should make use of any
available information. Bengt Holmstrom, Moral Hazard and Observability, 10 BELL J.
ECON. 74, 89 (1979) [hereinafter Holmstrom, Observability].
134. No weight is given to the absolute level of individual output. Tournaments may
provide winner-take-all prizes; loser forfeits all sanctions; or some more complicated
scheme that includes different prizes or sanctions for different relative ranks. Tournaments
have a complex effect on the risk borne by workers. They reduce risk to the extent they
screen out factors like market conditions outside the control of the worker. On the other
hand, tournaments may have a higher variance in payoffs than piece rates schemes, since
low-ranked players may receive nothing at all. Barry J. Nalebuff & Joseph E. Stiglitz,
Prizes and Incentives: Towards a General Theory of Compensation and Competition, 14
BELL J. ECON. 21, 22–23, 26, 40 (1983).
135. Since output levels can be confounded by forces like market conditions outside the
worker’s control, they are an imperfect measure of worker effort. In a manufacturing setting
such risks include machine failure, while in a sales commission setting, an important risk
would be fluctuation in demand for the product sold. Given fixed information, the usual
optimum is a linear combination of fixed salary and piece rates based on all available
signals of output level and only a second best is possible. Holmstrom, Observability, supra
note 133, at 89. If additional information besides output is available, such as even imperfect
observation of effort or of production risks, using that information will improve the
compensation scheme. Id.
136. Edward P. Lazear & Sherwin Rosen, Rank-Order Tournaments as Optimum Labor
Contracts, 89 J. POL. ECON. 841, 842 (1981) (two agents); Jerry R. Green & Nancy L.
Stokey, A Comparison of Tournaments and Contracts, 91 J. POL. ECON. 349, 351 (1983)
(multiple agents); Nalebuff & Stiglitz, supra note 134, at 23.
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value. In the words of Bengt Holmstrom, a founder of modern personnel
economics, “Competition per se is worthless.”137
2. Sex Differences
The relative merits of evaluations and incentive contracts appear to be
different for the average male and average female worker. Low-powered
incentives that use minimal evaluation and performance pay are likely to
work better for the average woman than for the average man. Statistically,
women seem to shirk less than men and to have an edge in
conscientiousness,
intrinsic
motivation,
self-discipline,
and
trustworthiness.138 Two real world examples of this are the increasingly
large female advantage in academic achievement and the higher repayment
rates of female borrowers in microfinance settings.139 Low shirking makes
low monitoring more attractive. Low-powered incentives may also appeal
to the average woman’s preference for lower risk and more egalitarian pay
schemes. However, low-powered incentives run the risk of attracting
workers who shirk. An employer who prefers a work culture with lowpowered incentives will be tempted to discriminate against male workers,
and such a culture will be most likely to succeed in jobs whose intrinsic
characteristics tend to attract women rather than men.
The importance of agreement suggests that work practices based on
subjective evaluation are more likely to work with the average woman than
with the average man. On average, both men and women tend to be
overconfident, but men substantially more so. If supervisory evaluations
are on average accurate, then those evaluations will diverge more from the
self-evaluations of male workers than of female workers, and subjective
evaluations will be less useful in employment contracts with males.140 If
employees update their self-assessment, then evaluation-based work
practices may be more suited to female than male workers. Women’s self
evaluations are not only more accurate to begin with but are more readily
and symmetrically updated in response to both positive and negative
feedback.
Because output measures are relatively clear, incentive contracts
reduce disputes about performance, but at the cost of higher than ideal risk137. Bengt Holmstrom, Moral Hazard in Teams, 13 BELL J. ECON. 324, 324 (1982)
[hereinafter Holmstrom, Teams]. This result is an implication of most of the papers
discussed in this section: “competition among agents . . . has merit solely as a device to
extract information optimally.” Id. Rank order tournaments that use only relative measures
of output are useful only when absolute measures are hard to obtain. Id. at 334–36.
138. See supra Section II.
139. Bert D’Espallier et al., Women and Repayment in Microfinance: A Global Analysis,
39 WORLD DEVELOPMENT 758, 769–70 (2011); Duckworth & Seligman, supra note 113, at
205.
140. This conclusion is complicated by the possibility of bias in subjective ratings.
However, my purpose in this paper is to examine the problems that would remain even if
bias of the usual sorts had ended.
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bearing by employees.141 Men are more likely to dispute evaluations than
women, making incentive compensation relatively more attractive for male
than female workers. Men also tolerate higher levels of risk, even though
the source of this (risk assessment or preferences) is unclear.
Some jobs have features that create powerful incentives to use either
evaluations or incentives regardless of employee characteristics. For
example, the value of incentive pay is highest when an employee’s output
can be readily measured, and sales are among the clearest metrics in the
modern economy.
However, evaluations or incentives may be
implemented in many ways, and the preferable form may depend on
employee characteristics. Even though women are more risk-averse than
men, Nordstrom uses incentive commissions. Yet while commissions are
the centerpiece of the Sears system, Nordstrom takes considerable pains to
ensure that employees receive other forms of monitoring and evaluation.
This additional input reduces the risk that an employee will suffer longterm career consequences because of chance factors, such as fluctuations in
traffic during assigned shifts.
In other jobs where output is less measurable, evaluations will
necessarily play an important role. However, evaluations may be
formulated and delivered to employees in many different ways. Even if
workers are biased in their self-evaluation and tend to resist employer
input, subjective contracts may work if employers behave strategically.
Employers can compensate for overconfidence by applying a deflation
factor to self-evaluations and by providing employees with highly negative
feedback. The harsh methods employed by Salomon might have been
rational efforts to deflate the egos of the would-be Masters of the Universe
drawn to the firm. But strategic feedback that undervalues performance to
achieve the desired response in the average man will be taken at face value
by the average woman, who will consequently be unnecessarily
discouraged.
Employee self-evaluations will reflect overconfidence from both sexes
but more from men. Any rule that interprets the self-evaluations of men
and women neutrally will tend to disadvantage women. Sears’ decision to
hire women into commission jobs depended in part on self-evaluations, and
this practice would seem to place women at a disadvantage. Differences in
self-evaluation may also contribute to the well-known tendency of women
to ask for less in negotiations, and a work culture in which workers are

141. Employers also bear another cost. Like all output contracts, individualistic output
contracts distort behavior towards readily observable tasks and away from less observable
ones, a phenomenon known as multitasking. A salesperson may obtain high sales by means
such as misrepresentation that ultimately hurt the employer. Bengt Holmstrom & Paul
Milgrom, Multitask Principal-Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and
Job Design, 7 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 24, 25 (1991); George P. Baker, Incentive Contracts and
Performance Measurement, 100 J. POL. ECON. 598, 599 (1992).
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expected to negotiate on their own behalf will tend to disadvantage
women.142
B. THE SOCIAL AND EMOTIONAL CONTEXT OF WORK
The austere models of personnel economics assume a rational and
wholly self-interested individual who is devoid of emotions and social
preferences, both positive and negative.143 These models provide some
insight into work culture and how it might be linked to sex differences.
This analysis, however, also leaves much unexplained. If competition per
se serves such a limited purpose, why did Sears place such a high value on
competitiveness? Why did Salomon Brothers tolerate and even encourage
not merely competitiveness but abuse? Why does Nordstrom invest such
effort in recognition, praise, mentoring, and mutual encouragement?
The answer to these questions begins with a distinction that is often
obscured in ordinary usage, in which the term “competitive” is used almost
synonymously with “motivated.” Distinguishing between these two
constructs is critical to understanding the implications of sex differences
for work cultures. Personnel economics provides a starting point for
understanding this distinction. Employee performance can often be
improved through incentive contracts, although these contracts unavoidably
shift more risk than is desirable to employees. Improved motivation can be
obtained solely by individualistic rewards for performance that are not in
the strict sense competitive since they do not depend on the outcomes of
others; only relative rewards are truly competitive and these have no
motivational value to a rational self-interested agent.
Relative
compensation can serve the informational goal of screening for common
risk but such screening can often be more effectively accomplished though
measures that do not require competitive relative compensation.
If game theorists recognize that “competition per se is worthless”144 to
a rational profit-maximizing employee, its critical role in male workplaces
must have a nonfinancial function. The studies that examine competitive
behavior indicate that the average man seems to enjoy competition as an
end in itself even when a piece rate would produce higher payoffs. In the
words of Joe Paterno, Penn State’s legendary football coach, “We strive to
be No. 1. . . . But win or lose, it is the competition which gives us
pleasure.”145

142. LINDA BABCOCK & SARA LASCHEVER, WOMEN DON’T ASK: NEGOTIATION AND THE
GENDER DIVIDE 131, 132, 142 (2003); Fiona Greig, Propensity To Negotiate and Career
Advancement: Evidence from an Investment Bank that Women Are on a “Slow Elevator,”
24 NEGOTIATION J. 495, 497 (2008).
143. In principle the implications of social preferences might be modeled, but at the
moment only more informal analysis is possible.
144. Holmstrom, Teams, supra note 137, at 324.
145. THOMAS A. TUTKO & BILL BRUNS, WINNING IS EVERYTHING AND OTHER AMERICAN
MYTHS 205 (1976).
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The average woman, in contrast, avoids competition even when it
would generate higher payoffs. In research studies, the taste for
competition has nothing to do with a taste for work; the alternative to
competition is not a fixed payment but rather a high-powered piece rate
incentive. Competitive situations attract men and repel women because of
the pure value each places on being ranked higher than someone else.
The recreational value of competition presumably explains why
practical jokes like those inflicted on poor Matty are so common in male
environments.146 Yet competition performs another role. Competition
does no more than piece rates to motivate the wholly self-interested
individual, but it does spur those with a social preference for competition to
accomplish more.
The recreational and motivational aspects of
competition are not easy to separate, and may reinforce each other.
Michael Lewis asks why the Salomon partners tolerated the back row
hooliganism. And why, one might also wonder, did they let competition
escalate into aggression by tolerating traders who threw phones at trainees?
Perhaps they believed that recreational and motivational competition feed
on each other, and perhaps there is an element of truth in their belief.
Obviously not all men require an environment with this level of antagonism
to perform at high levels: The environment can do much to shape human
personality. Yet environmental forces do not operate on a blank slate or
without cost, and modulating the aggressive tendencies of males is neither
a simple task nor one with an obvious end point.
The same competitive environments that improve men’s performance
do nothing to improve women’s performance. In impersonal laboratory
settings, competition does not actually decrease women’s performance,
leaving an interesting question as to why women avoid such environments
even when they would be beneficial. One possibility is that women are
more inequality-averse than men and dislike the ranking that is inherent in
competition. Female avoidance of real-life competitive environments is
easier to understand. In these environments, the instrumental competition
that motivates is often combined seamlessly with recreational aggression
that the average woman may find unpleasant. Women are more responsive
to feedback and more likely to worry that hazing rituals have some real
significance. And when horseplay becomes physical, women are far more
likely than men to feel real anxiety.
Sears insisted, correctly, that the average man is more competitive than
the average woman. From this premise, it proceeded to conclude that
women are intrinsically uncomfortable with commission sales, an inference
at odds with the use of significant commissions by Nordstrom. Women
were deterred from applying to sales positions at Sears not primarily
because of the use of commissions, but because the Sears culture

146. See supra Section I.
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encouraged salespeople to see themselves in a contest with other
salespeople rather than as part of a cooperative venture.

IV. POLICY TOWARDS DIFFERENCE
Research clearly indicates that the average man and woman today
exhibit differences in personality traits. The appropriate policy response to
such differences is less clear. If sex differences are purely a cultural
artifact, acknowledging differences may have the effect of reinforcing
them. This Section outlines the case that sex differences in personality
have some heritable component, so that differences in ideal work
environments are likely to persist over time. To some extent the problem
of work culture may sort itself out; eventually the labor market will tend to
produce specialized cultures that serve the needs of different personality
types, albeit at the cost of less than fully integrated work places. The most
critical problem facing public policy is the near-term rigidity of market
institutions. Work cultures that evolved in accord with male preferences do
not provide an atmosphere in which women can flourish, creating a vicious
circle of lower female achievement. The goal of public policy should be to
push employers to experiment with new work cultures, not to create a
permanent regime to regulate the work environment.
A. ACCOMMODATION AND STEREOTYPING
Under Title VII, policy towards the sex differences observed today can
take two basic forms.147 First, employers might be permitted to choose
freely among all non-sex-specific practices, regardless of whether those
practices tend to favor the average male or female. Second, employers
might be permitted or required to use gender-conscious practices that,
though neutral in form, were designed with sex differences in mind.148
Permissible gender-conscious practices could not be designed to favor men,
but might attempt either not to favor either sex or to redress the problems
historically faced by women.
The choice among these policies towards work cultures depends in part
on whether observed sex differences have some heritable component. To
the extent that current sex differences are the result of discrimination, any
gender-conscious policy, even one that is formally sex-neutral, may seem
problematic because of its tendency to preserve the status quo by
reinforcing stereotypes. The position of women may best be improved by

147. A third option is possible: employers might be permitted to choose any sex-specific
policy they wanted. This is prohibited by Title VII, and the wisdom of this prohibition will
not be reexamined here.
148. Mary Anne Case, Disaggregating Gender from Sex and Sexual Orientation: The
Effeminate Man in the Law and Feminist Jurisprudence, 105 YALE L.J. 1, 73–75 (1995);
Lucinda M. Finley, Choice and Freedom: Elusive Issues in the Search for Gender Justice,
96 YALE L.J. 914, 939 (1987).
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reducing discrimination and encouraging women to take nontraditional
paths149: As discrimination falls, the differences between men and women
will lessen, and the problem of work culture will solve itself. However,
even if sex differences result entirely from discrimination, two
considerations must be balanced against stereotyping costs. First, under
current circumstances, a neutral but male-oriented system will operate to
women’s disadvantage and if change seems slow, accommodation may be
worth the risk of some stereotyping. Second, though female traits may be
the product of discrimination, they may nonetheless be valuable, and there
may be a general social interest in encouraging a more androgynous
culture. The view that sex differences result primarily from discrimination
thus points to sex-neutral practices but perhaps ones that are genderconscious.
If, however, sex-differences have a heritable component, no long-run
policy option is very attractive. Even after intentional discrimination has
been eliminated, the average man and the average woman will be most
comfortable in somewhat different work environments and a single uniform
culture will serve neither well. Unregulated markets cannot be counted on
to provide female-friendly environments: The males who continue to
dominate high status jobs may, even with the best intentions, fail to
produce cultures congenial to women, at least for very long time of
transition. Yet regulation too has no mechanism for producing desirable
pluralism. The law cannot realistically require each firm to provide a
diverse set of internal work environments to accommodate the average
member of each sex: Many aspects of work culture are indivisible, and
each workplace has a certain tone that affects all who work there. And
there is simply no way to legislate pluralism between firms. The law must
set a single standard, and cannot tell some firms to adopt one kind of policy
and other firms to adopt another. The next two sections will argue that the
evidence supports a role for heritability, and that the resulting difficult
problems must be faced. The next two sections will argue that the evidence
supports a role for heritability, and that the resulting difficult problems
must be faced.
B. NATURE AND NURTURE
Among biologists there is virtually complete agreement that some sex
differences in personality have both an environmental and a heritable150

149. Schultz, Telling Stories About Women and Work, supra note 3, at 1839.
150. “Heritability” is the proportion of observed variation in a population that is
attributable to genetic variation among individuals. To say that X “is genetic” implies that it
is solely genetic in origin, like the fact that humans have opposable thumbs. To say that X
“is heritable” more clearly conveys the joint role of genes and environment, as does the
phrase “has a genetic component.” The word “biological” is not really equivalent to
“genetic” or “heritable.” Any physiological phenomenon can be called biological although
most are the result of both heritable and environmental forces.
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basis, though the exact roles of environment and genetics are hard to
disentangle.151 The literature on this subject is large and expanding rapidly,
and what follows is a cursory survey.
1. Physiology
A large body of evidence, including sibling studies and physiology,
suggests some genetic basis for personality traits in general152 and for the
statistical differences observed between men and women. Significant
differences have been observed in the physiology of male and female
brains. Sexual dimorphism has been found in brain chemistry153 and in the
amount154 and distribution155 of various types of brain tissue. The best
understood mechanism156 of neural sex differentiation occurs around the
seventh week of fetal development.157 The newly formed testes start to
secrete testosterone that operates on androgen receptors in some regions of
the brain to produce both structural and functional sex differences that are
called “organizational” because they persist regardless of subsequent
hormone levels. Further organizational changes from internally produced
hormones occur during puberty. Except at such critical periods, temporary
levels of hormones in the bloodstream generally do not have permanent
structural effects, but may have activational effects on behavior during the
time they are present.

151. Melissa Hines, Sex-Related Variation in Human Behavior and the Brain, 14 TRENDS
COGNITIVE SCI. 448, 448 (2010) [hereinafter Hines, Sex-Related Variation]. Hines’s
perspective is especially interesting because she is an important researcher and has urged
caution in drawing inferences that sex differences in behavior have a genetic basis.
MELISSA HINES, BRAIN GENDER 155–56 (2004).
152. See, e.g., Randy J. Nelson & Brian C. Trainor, Neural Mechanisms of Aggression, 8
NATURE REVS. NEUROSCIENCE 536, 541–42 (2007); Kai MacDonald & Tina Marie
MacDonald, The Peptide that Binds: A Systematic Review of Oxytocin and Its Prosocial
Effects in Humans, 18 HARVARD REV. PSYCHIATRY 1, 2, 4, 8–10 (2010).
153. Kelly P. Cosgrove et al., Evolving Knowledge of Sex Differences in Brain Structure,
Function, and Chemistry, 62 BIOLOGICAL PSYCHIATRY 847, 850–52 (2007); Larry Cahill,
Why Sex Matters for Neuroscience, 7 NATURE REVS. NEUROSCIENCE 477, 481–82 (2006).
154. Cosgrove et al., supra note 153, at 850–52.
155. Ruben C. Gur et al., Sex Differences in Brain Gray and White Matter in Healthy
Young Adults: Correlations with Cognitive Performance, 19 J. NEUROSCIENCE 4065, 4067–
69 (1999); Richard J. Haier et al., The Neuroanatomy of General Intelligence: Sex Matters,
25 NEUROIMAGE 320, 321–26 (2005).
156. Recent research suggests that other genes also contribute to sexual dimorphism.
Arthur P. Arnold, Sex Chromosomes and Brain Gender, 5 NATURE REVS. NEUROSCIENCE 1,
6–7 (2004); Arthur P. Arnold et al., Minireview: Sex Chromosomes and Brain Sexual
Differentiation, 145 ENDOCRINOLOGY 1057, 1061 (2004); Ian W. Craig et al., The Genetic
Basis for Sex Differences in Human Behaviour: Role of the Sex Chromosomes, 68 ANNALS
HUM. GENETICS 269, 269, 280–81 (2004).
157. For excellent recent surveys, see Melissa Hines, Early Androgen Influences on
Human Neural and Behavioural Development, 84 EARLY HUM. DEV. 805 (2008)
[hereinafter Hines, Early Androgen Influences]; Hines, Sex-Related Variation, supra note
151.
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The circulating hormone levels that have both organizational and
activational consequences have a significant heritable component, but are
also influenced by environment. For instance, feedback from success or
failure tends to depress testosterone.158 Differences in the levels of positive
reinforcement given to boys and girls could have activational effects and
also influence the organizational changes that occur at puberty. The effect
of environment on testosterone levels also complicates analysis of the
activational effects on testosterone, since causal conclusions cannot be
drawn simply from observation of correlations.
Levels of prenatal exposure to hormones have been linked to sexdifferentiated behaviors including childhood play and personality
characteristics such as empathy and aggression.159 The concept of effect
size is tricky in these contexts, but measured in terms of standard
deviations these sex differences are much larger than observed differences
in cognition.160
2. Cross-Cultural Evidence
Cross cultural studies show that the degree of sex differences in
personality traits varies widely among societies.161 Environment thus
clearly plays a role in sex differences. However, a surprising piece of
evidence suggests a role for heredity. Sex differences in personality traits
appear to be larger in more affluent egalitarian cultures that provide
women with opportunities relatively comparable to those of men.162 These
societies also have greater sexual dimorphism in non-personality traits such
as height and blood pressure.163 A number of explanations for this have
been explored, and the most persuasive appears to be the general principle
that better environments drive up the importance of genetics. Within poor
societies, even small differences in each individual’s environment can
create large variation in individual outcomes. However, improvements in
environment presumably have a diminishing marginal effect. As the
quality of the average environment rises, variation in environment within
the society has less effect, and genes become more important in explaining
all types of interpersonal variation.164

158. See, e.g., Sari M. Anders & Neil V. Watson, Social Neuroendocrinology: Effects of
Social Contexts and Behaviors on Sex Steroids in Humans, 17 HUM. NATURE 212 (2006).
159. Hines, Early Androgen Influences, supra note 157; Hines, Sex-Related Variation,
supra note 151.
160. Hines, Sex-Related Variation, supra note 151.
161. Schmitt et al., supra note 84; Costa, Jr. et al., Gender Differences, supra note 72.
162. Schmitt et al., supra note 84; Costa, Jr. et al., Gender Differences, supra note 72.
163. Schmitt et al., supra note 84, at 176.
164. Id. at 179–80.
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3. Evolutionary Psychology
The field of evolutionary psychology attempts to explain many aspects
of human behavior, including sex differences, as the product of
evolutionary pressures. One school of evolutionary psychology—the Man
the Hunter approach—argues that men will inevitably dominate the
workplace.165 Like all evolutionary perspectives on sex roles, it begins
with the theory of parental investment.166 Parental investment theory is
grounded on the observation that each sex faces a different set of
physiological constraints, and postulates that these affect its optimal
resource allocation.167 Through gestation and lactation, female mammals
are obligated to make a far greater investment in their offspring than males,
and parental investment theory infers that males will compete for the scarce
resource of female reproductive capacity. 168
The Man the Hunter approach argues that human male competition
consists primarily of efforts to provide females with resources such as
food.169 Because of their long dependency, human children require the
complete long-term attention of their mothers, who must depend on males
for resource provision. From this perspective, a male orientation in work
cultures is simply a consequence of greater male involvement in resource
production.
Other scholars have questioned the Man the Hunter paradigm, noting
that parental investment theory is consistent with an enormous range of
mating patterns.170 Mate competition may consist of many behaviors,
including resource provision, but also including killing or dominating
members of the same sex, mate guarding, and enticing the opposite sex by
displays of genetic fitness.
Resource provision is actually rather
uncommon in species like mammals where fertilization occurs internally,
making paternity relatively uncertain: no male resource provision at all is
found in ninety-five percent of all mammalian species.171 In the human
165. Kingsley R. Browne, Sex and Temperament in Modern Society: A Darwinian View
of the Glass Ceiling and the Gender Gap, 37 ARIZ. L. REV. 971 (1995).
166. Robert L. Trivers, Parental Investment and Sexual Selection, in SEXUAL SELECTION
AND THE DESCENT OF MAN, 1871–1971, at 136 (Bernard Campbell ed., 1972).
167. Id. at 139–40.
168. Id.
169. Richard B. Lee & Irven DeVore, Problems in the Study of Hunters and Gatherers, in
MAN THE HUNTER 3, 11 (Richard B. Lee et al., eds., 1968).
170. A number of evolutionary psychologists have noted both this flexibility and its
implications for political issues surrounding sex roles. Barbara Smuts, The Evolutionary
Origins of Patriarchy, 6 HUM. NATURE 1 (1995); Sarah Blaffer Hrdy, Sex Bias in Nature
and in History: A Late 1980s Reexamination of the “Biological Origins” Argument, 33 AM.
J. PHYSICAL ANTHROPOLOGY 25 (1990); J.B. Lancaster, A Feminist and Evolutionary
Biologist Looks at Women, 34 AM. J. PHYSICAL ANTHROPOLOGY 1 (1991). In the legal
literature, this point is made in Mary Anne Case, Of Richard Epstein and Other Radical
Feminists, 18 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 369 (1994); Katharine Baker, Biology for Feminists,
75 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 805 (1999).
171. T.H. CLUTTON BROCK, THE EVOLUTION OF PARENTAL CARE 132 (1991).
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foraging societies of special interest to evolutionary theory, mothers
provided about one third of the food supply.172
Evolutionary psychology thus does not support the view that males will
inevitably tend to monopolize resource provision through competition. It is
consistent with a great deal of flexibility of sex roles between societies.
Still, it does suggest that sex roles may exhibit certain general tendencies.
Mate competition implies that males are far more likely than females to
engage in unprovoked aggression, especially physical aggression. The
possibility of pregnancy may tend to make females less trusting of
strangers. Thus, the role that women play in resource provision will
depend not on their interest in resource provision as such but on whether
the work environment is designed to meet their other personality traits.
4. Policy
Any attempt to extract generalizations about sex differences from
empirical research must be conducted with great care. Scientific evidence
suggests that sex differences are complex and subtle and no doubt some of
the results described in previous Sections will be later revised. Although
there is evidence that some sex differences have a heritable component,173
environment clearly also plays an important role. Even to the extent that
robust conclusions can be reached, the temptation to characterize an
essential male or female nature must be resisted. Essentialism is
empirically unfounded, since the evidence supports statistical differences
only, and may stigmatize individuals who deviate from some supposed
norm. Indeed, even statistical generalizations may lead to is-ought
confusions.
Just because one sex shows a “natural” tendency towards a trait does
not mean that trait is immutable or should be encouraged. On the contrary,
there are strong arguments in favor of at least some efforts to socialize both
males and females to be more like each other. Even heritable traits can be
environmentally modified, as witnessed by the extraordinary success that
many societies have had in reducing the violence that characterized early
social groups.174 Sometimes society chooses to fight natural tendencies,
sometimes to celebrate them, and sometimes simply to go along with them.
Modification, however, requires some understanding of the baseline traits
with which one is working. Quite apart from the question of sex
differences, no one method of upbringing works with all children, as any
parent of even two children can attest. The same approach will have utterly

172. Frank W. Marlowe, The Mating System of Foragers in the Standard Cross-Cultural
Sample, 37 CROSS-CULTURAL RESEARCH 282, 290 (2003).
173. See supra Section IV.A.
174. STEVEN PINKER, THE BETTER ANGELS OF OUR NATURE: WHY VIOLENCE HAS
DECLINED (2011). Pinker's argument is developed through the book's over eight hundred
pages, but a summary can be found in Chapter 1. Id. at 1–30.
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different effects on an anxious child and an impulsive one. Whether we
choose to allow heritable tendencies to play out or to fight them, we must
have some sense of what they are and how they work.
C. THE MARKET FOR WORK CULTURE
At the moment, work cultures reflect a history of male domination of
market labor. However, the past decades have seen increasing numbers of
women in positions of leadership where they might effect change in work
cultures, and so it is worth considering whether market forces will tend to
create the multiplicity of work cultures needed to accommodate both the
average man and the average woman.
1. Work Cultures in Perfect Markets
The production of work cultures by firms and the resulting
occupational concentration175 by sex depends on many factors.
a. Internal Cultures in Single-Job Firms
Many dimensions of culture are by definition collective: a firm cannot
easily have both a competitive- and a consensus-oriented culture, though it
can have an intermediate between the two. Thus, along many dimensions,
a uniform culture will tend to prevail within individual firms. With an
industry more variation is possible. Individual firms may develop cultures
that are congenial to specific personalities.176 In securities markets, the
clientele effect is the tendency of investors with certain needs to purchase
the stocks of certain boutique firms, and a similar effect draws workers to
firms whose cultures they find hospitable.
The implications of these principles can be seen by making some
simplifying assumptions. Assume that internal firm work cultures are
monolithic and indivisible. There are both males and females with an
aptitude for each occupation, though in different proportions in each
occupation.177 The aptitude for each job is binary—you either have it or
you don’t. Each firm employs workers in only a single occupation. The
traits that determine occupational aptitude are uncorrelated to those that
175. In labor economics, the term “occupational segregation” is used to describe how men
and women are distributed across occupations. In this setting the term “segregation” is
purely descriptive and does not imply any particular hypothesis about the cause of
segregation, such as discrimination. Outside of labor economics, however, the term
“segregation” is often understood to imply discrimination or even legal compulsion, and so I
avoid it here.
176. The economic value of sorting by tastes has been frequently noted by Richard
Epstein. See, e.g., RICHARD EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS 60–69 (1992). Epstein is in my
view quite correct to insist on the importance of sorting; my views differ from his in our
characterizations of the nature of sex differences and our expectations about how fast
markets will adjust to social changes.
177. The evidence for heritable differences in aptitudes is summarized in Deborah M.
Weiss, The Annoyingly Indeterminate Effects of Sex Differences, 19 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 99
(2010).
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determine work culture preference. However, all men work best in work
culture XY and all women in work culture XX.
Assume for the moment a so-called frictionless market with perfect
information and no adjustment costs. No participant in the market has a
taste for discrimination and the only forces that tend to produce
occupational concentration by sex are differences between the average
members of each sex. With these assumptions, the market will tend to
produce fully specialized firms, each with a pure form of work culture XX
or XY. But though each firm will employ disproportionately high numbers
of one sex, the market will be meritocratic. Most members of each sex will
be able to find a suitable environment to maximize their earnings
potential.178 Only where one sex has an extreme comparative advantage in
the underlying occupation will able individuals of the less-able sex have
difficulty finding a suitable work culture.179
With no institutional rigidities, this equilibrium should generally be
reached even from a discriminatory or at least historically different starting
point. Suppose women are initially outside the labor market in household
production. When they enter the labor market, they will initially find
themselves in cultures that do not maximize their potential and they will
therefore underperform. Enterprising firms, however, will soon realize that
cheap labor can be obtained by offering a female-friendly work culture;
women will perform well in these environments. Other firms will adopt the
new culture, bidding up women’s wages, and a meritocratic though not
fully integrated market equilibrium will be attained.
b. Team Production
No real firm has only one type of job, and workers who hold various
jobs typically function together in work groups or teams. Within each

178. A related argument has recently been made in an interesting article by Jonah Gelbach
et al., Passive Discrimination: When Does It Make Sense To Pay Too Little, 76 U. CHI. L.
REV. 797 (2009). They note that compensation packages may have both cash and in-kind
components such as pensions, note that two groups of workers may place different
valuations on each compensation type, and examine the extent to which these taste
differences are likely to produce sorting into different firms. Id. at 808–12. Suppose that
firms have a cost advantage in producing the in-kind good, as they do with pensions and
health insurance. By providing a mixed compensation package, some fraction of firms can
attract all workers who value the good at a lower cost than by providing cash only. The
remainder of firms will provide cash only packages. This will lead to complete segregation
of the two types of workers. This analysis assumes that workers differ in their consumption
utility but have identical marginal products across work environments and incentive
packages. A work culture analysis assumes identical consumption utility but differences in
productivity in different environments. The basic static result is the same in work culture
and compensation cases. Differences among workers can make segregation efficient
without imposing monetary costs on either group of workers or on firms. Past this point,
compensation and culture raise some different issues that I will discuss later.
179. This problem will be exacerbated if occupational ability is correlated to work culture
preferences.
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work group,180 a firm’s ability to provide different cultures to different job
classifications is limited by the need for team production. An office in
which the top management operates under pressure is likely to be a high
stress environment for the support staff, and methods for differentiating
incentives within a job are even more limited. The more that members of
each occupation must work together, the less divisible work culture will be.
This will tend to dampen polarization into extreme work cultures and
produce cultures that are hybrids of the pure XX and XY types. Since sex
differences in work culture preferences are statistical rather than universal,
a hybrid work culture should reduce within-firm occupational
concentration by sex. For instance, some males in occupation A who could
not function well in a pure XX environment might be able to tolerate a
hybrid environment induced by combining the cultures of occupation A
and B. On the other hand, integration may be purchased at a price:
everyone has to compromise and no one gets the work culture that they
value most highly.
Firms may have some ability to create different work cultures for
various jobs within work groups by different work rules and by different
incentive structures. Such techniques will produce a result that is
intermediate between the team production case and the single job case:
each job will have more work culture specialization and more occupational
concentration by sex. Again, there is a trade-off between catering to the
preferences of each group and occupational integration.
c. Multiple Internal Cultures
Even within a given occupation, it is possible to imagine a firm giving
employees a few choices. For example, Sears might have given sales
personnel the choice between straight salary and a riskier but higher mean
commission scheme. The ability to tailor culture within jobs should create
a mosaic of specialized work cultures within the job and decrease
concentration by sex within the job, the firm, and the industry.181 Such
fine-tuning may be the only way around the trade-off between occupational
concentration and providing each group with its preferred work culture.
Whether firms can realistically give employees such choices is a more
difficult and as yet unanswered question.

180. Different work groups might have different cultures so that jobs in the front office
may feel different from those in the loading dock.
181. Work culture and compensation cases raise slightly different divisibility problems,
and compensation appears to be far more divisible than work culture. Often there seems to
be no reason why firms cannot offer both a cash and a mixed compensation package, and
indeed such choices have been increasing as shown by the trend away from traditional
pensions and towards 401(k)s. In a few cases though, the firm’s cost advantage requires
mandatory participation. Allowing employees to opt out of health coverage would create
the same adverse selection found in the private insurance market, and adverse selection may
explain the trend away from firms offering annuity options in pension plans.
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D. POLICY
A frictionless market will tend to produce work cultures that are
occupationally concentrated by sex at the firm level but less concentrated
and more meritocratic at the industry level. The tendency towards
specialized cultures is partially offset at the firm level by team production
but at the cost of providing the average member of each sex a less than
ideal work culture. This trade-off between firm level concentration by sex
and accommodating each sex can only be avoided to the extent that firms
can tailor each worker’s individual environment to that individual’s tastes.
The exact welfare analysis of this market is complex but on the whole
there would seem to be no strong case for interference absent the question
of fairness to women.182 Precisely what such fairness requires is not an
easy question. Some might regard de facto sex segregation at the firm level
as an evil in itself. However, I would not personally be disturbed by a
concentration by sex that resulted from individual choice, that did not result
from the underestimation of female ability, and that tended to enhance
female achievement by providing environments conducive to success.
The strongest case for legal interference in work culture rests not on the
intrinsic value of sex integration but on the history of female exclusion
from the labor market, especially from the most prestigious positions. As
circumstances have changed, women have entered the labor market in
greater numbers. In a frictionless market, firms would quickly recognize
the advantages of providing work cultures congenial to this new pool of
workers. Real markets are not frictionless, and various impediments will
slow the movement of the market towards an equitable equilibrium. The
adjustment of the labor market depends on the quality of information that
firms have about women workers. Some of this information is gathered by
observing the performance of female workers. Yet when women first enter
the labor market, they must often function in work cultures that have
developed to motivate males. Women underperform in such environments,
thus slowing the revision of rational but inaccurate generalizations about
female potential. The persistent conflation of competitiveness with
motivation testifies to how hard male norms are to revise. Historical
182. Quite apart from the issue of sex equality, some people will have personalities that
are out of sync with their talents: A mathematician who enjoys pro wrestling and monster
trucks may feel permanently out of place at work. Welfarist ethical theories may support
some compensation for inconvenient tastes. See generally Ronald Dworkin, What Is
Equality? Part 1: Equality of Welfare, 10 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 185 (1981); Ronald Dworkin,
What Is Equality? Part 2: Equality of Resources, 10 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 283 (1981). The
Second Theorem of Welfare Economics suggests that redistribution may be better left to the
tax system, but the analysis of this proposition has turned out to be far more complex than it
first appeared and redistribution through interference in labor markets cannot be ruled out.
Chris William Sanchirico, Taxes Versus Legal Rules as Instruments for Equity: A More
Equitable View, 29 J. LEGAL STUDIES 797 (2000). Thus, a case might be made for
encouraging work cultures that are less specialized than what the market would produce.
Nonetheless, such tinkering seems unlikely to do much good.
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circumstances can create a vicious circle. Even employers without any
animus, using sophisticated updating strategies, correctly observe that
women perform worse than men and therefore statistically discriminate
against them. This discrimination in turn discourages women from
acquiring relevant skills, perpetuating a true generalization about ability
and leaving the market in a stable but inefficient equilibrium. The vicious
circle problem has been extensively analyzed in the somewhat simpler
context of pure human capital acquisition, without the complication of
work culture.183 The phenomenon of work culture would seem to
exacerbate this problem, since the viability of new work cultures requires a
critical mass of qualified workers.
The adjustment of market work cultures is further slowed by the
generally poor dissemination of information in the labor market. Workers
are less fungible than commodities like capital, and so the information
requirements of the labor market are unusually high. At the same time, as
Cynthia Estlund has recently pointed out, legal disclosure mandates are
relatively rare in the labor market.184 Neither workers nor competitors have
a good idea of what is going on in any given firm. This impedes the sorting
of workers by firm culture and the diffusion of information about
innovations in firm cultures. Contractual anomalies such as the at-will rule
further blunt employer incentives to collect information about worker
performance.185 Without good information, employers have limited ability
to modify their workplaces to improve worker performance.
If work cultures are relatively slow to evolve, the legal system might
do well to prod them in some way. Yet this brings us back to the
conundrum that opened this section: the ultimate goal of policy is a world
with multiple cultures that provides environments where all can flourish.
But pluralism is hard to legislate: The law must set one standard for all.
The next section will examine whether any legal rules might nonetheless
hasten the evolution of work culture.

V. THE LAW GOVERNING WORK CULTURE
Work cultures intended to keep out women are surely prohibited by
Title VII, but what of those that disadvantage women not by design but by
historical accident? This section suggests that legal intervention in maleoriented work culture is worth considering, but that it is best confined to
183. Amy Farmer & Dek Terrell, Discrimination, Bayesian Updating of Employer Beliefs
and Human Capital Accumulation, 34 ECON. INQUIRY 204 (1996); George J. Mailath et al.,
Endogenous Inequality in Integrated Labor Markets with Two-Sided Search, 90 AM. ECON.
REV. 46 (2000); Lawrence E. Blume, Learning and Statistical Discrimination, 95 AM.
ECON. REV. 118 (2005).
184. Cynthia Estlund, Just the Facts: The Case for Workplace Transparency, 63 STAN. L.
REV. 351 (2011).
185. Deborah M. Weiss, Discrimination and Failure in the Marketplace of Ideas
(2013) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
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extreme behavior that might also be regulated on grounds unrelated to its
effect on women. Plaintiffs might also indirectly challenge such cultures
by a new approach to the lack of interest defense. Rather than denying the
existence of sex differences, plaintiffs might instead question whether sex
differences take the particular form asserted by defendants. Finally, the
Supreme Court’s 2009 decision in Ricci v. DeStefano has the potential to
interfere with voluntary employer efforts to devise work cultures that are
congenial to women, and this section proposes a modified affirmative
action defense that would permit desirable innovation.
A. WHAT MUST EMPLOYERS DO?
1. Two Theories
Employer obligations under Title VII are governed by two theories of
recovery, disparate treatment and disparate impact. Disparate treatment
liability requires a showing of intent to discriminate, while disparate impact
does not.186 Title VII’s prohibition of disparate treatment is virtually
absolute and intentional sex discrimination is permitted only if it falls under
one of a few specified exceptions, all of which are carefully circumscribed.
In contrast, the plaintiff in a disparate impact case does not claim that
the employer discriminated intentionally but rather that one of defendant’s
employment practices had a disparately negative effect on members of the
protected class.187 This claim is typically supported by statistical evidence
of the effects of the practice on the protected group and others. If the
plaintiff succeeds in showing a disparate effect, the defendant has the
opportunity to provide evidence that the practice is job-related and
consistent with business necessity.188

186.

(a) Employer practices. It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an
employer--(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin; or (2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees
or applicants for employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive
any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status
as an employee, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin.
Civil Rights Act of 1964, H.R. 7152, 88th Cong. § 703(a) (1964) (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2012)). Disparate impact theory has been partly codified by later
legislation, though in an unsystematic way. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k).
187. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1) (2006).
188. Id. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i). This section, added by the Civil Rights Act of 1991, does
not set out standards for business necessity and job-relatedness, but rather selectively
incorporates by reference parts of the previous case law. 137 CONG. REC. 28622 (1991).
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The line between disparate impact and disparate treatment theories is
less clear than it might first appear.189 I next examine a few policy
considerations common to both.
2. Targeted Conduct
Judicial micromanagement of firm culture would be ill-advised. Courts
lack the institutional competence to serve as managers.190 Certain aspects
of work culture are entwined with voluntary social behavior, and detailed
oversight would impinge unacceptably on associational freedoms.191
Close supervision of work culture is especially undesirable if sex
differences have a heritable component, so that both men and women are
best served by a diverse menu of specialized work cultures. Both disparate
impact and disparate treatment must impose a uniform standard on all
firms. They might require that work cultures adopt an androgynous
compromise between the needs of men and women; they might require
choice in divisible components of work culture; or they might require
cultures with a female bias. The one thing the law cannot do is to require
certain firms to provide female cultures and others to provide male
cultures, and yet this is what seems desirable in the long run.
The limits of our current knowledge about sex differences also suggest
caution in devising gender-conscious policies. More open discussion of
statistical sex differences is critical to further progress for women in the
workplace. However, these differences are complex and incompletely
understood. Liability based on evidence of sex differences crystallizes in a
legal precedent a particular view of these differences. This view may be
difficult to dislodge as scientific evidence evolves. Even if the scientific
community reaches a relatively stable consensus on some point, the
courtroom has not proven to be an ideal setting to convey the state of
scientific research, and research findings may end up in legal opinions in an
overgeneralized form that reinforces undesirable stereotypes.192
For all these reasons, a firm’s compensation policies, its competitive
tone, and most other features of work culture should generally be immune
from direct regulation. In one area, however, some intervention deserves
consideration. Men no less than women deserve a workplace that helps
them realize their potential, and their preferred environment may seem
harsh by female standards. However, human preferences are neither fixed
nor deserving of complete deference.193
A useful perspective on

189. George Rutherglen, Disparate Impact, Discrimination, and the Essentially Contested
Concept of Equality, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 2313, 2313 (2005) [hereinafter Rutherglen,
Essentially Contested Concept of Equality].
190. Green, supra note 4, at 676.
191. Id. at 631.
192. A similar concern has been expressed by Tristan Green. See id. at 672–74.
193. Some feminists may be uncomfortable with a discrimination policy that embodies
values beyond respect for individual choice, but Kimberly Yuracko has convincingly
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malleability can be gained by a quick survey of the history of violence,
which indicates that modern society has done a remarkable job of
suppressing some of our aggressive impulses.194 No simple formula can
determine the optimal level of workplace aggression, but there is little
support today for allowing the physical violence and intimidation that is at
issue in a surprising number of cases. The average man may always thrive
in more adversary environments than the average women, but the
physically aggressive work cultures that are problematic for women are
also more generally socially undesirable.
Improvements to work culture may need to begin long before young
people enter the labor market. Socialization of both sexes towards—
though not necessarily to—an androgynous norm would reduce conflicts in
the workplace. Ironically such socialization may best be achieved through
sex-segregated education. Girls may need gentle encouragement to
become more competitive,195 while boys may best be civilized in an
environment that meets their needs for aggression.
But even adults can be channeled towards desired behavior, and the
regulation of work culture may be part of this process. Intimidating
Socratic interrogation and compensation by commission may be useful
tools for managing men, but when equal opportunity abuse includes
physical attacks and intimidation196 the law may wish to place a ceiling on
the acceptable level of workplace aggression.
Liability at the margins for extreme conduct will not cause immediate
and widespread changes in other aspects of work culture but perhaps it
does not have to. Even circumscribed liability may prompt a few firms to
consider more general modifications to their culture, and a few successful
models may provide a catalyst for others to adopt policies more congenial
argued that feminists cannot successfully develop their case independent of a conception of
social value. KIMBERLY YURACKO, PERFECTIONISM AND CONTEMPORARY FEMINIST VALUES
(2003). In her words, “feminists’ arguments are driven by perfectionism, not neutral
principles.” Id. at 5.
194. See ERIC ARTHUR JOHNSON & ERIC H. MONKKONEN, THE CIVILIZATION OF CRIME:
VIOLENCE IN TOWN AND COUNTRY SINCE THE MIDDLE AGES (1996); TED ROBERT GURR,
VIOLENCE IN AMERICA: THE HISTORY OF CRIME (1989); PINKER, supra note 174.
195. Anson Dorrance coached the American women's soccer team to its first world title,
and the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill women's soccer team to eighteen
collegiate championships. John M. Silva III, Psychological Aspects of Competition: An
Interview with Anson Dorrance Head Women’s Soccer Coach at The University of North
Carolina, 11 J. EXCELLENCE 88, 88 (2006). In an interview, he commented that the “biggest
concern with the females is they don't naturally compete,” and credited the success of his
program to fact that “we train them to compete.” Id. at 97. To do so, however, he adopts an
approach quite different from what he would have used with men. “A part of what
motivates a man,” he said, “is for the coach to actually scream at him during the game,”
while the identical approach with a woman athlete “will actually shatter her confidence.”
Id. at 99. With female athletes, he concluded, “[Y]ou've got to be overwhelmingly
positive.” This difference pervades his coaching process: “We use videotape to show
women they can play. With men, we show them they can’t.” Id. at 100.
196. See supra Section I.
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to women. Not all firms will or should adopt these innovations. The goal
is not to make all firms female-friendly but to make enough.
3. Disparate Treatment or Disparate Impact?
A work culture practice adopted for the conscious purpose of excluding
one sex would constitute disparate treatment, even if that work culture also
served some legitimate business purpose.197 Such situations are rare, and
the facts described in Liar’s Poker and Sears are more typical. Maleoriented work cultures typically develop primarily at the times when a
workplace is populated primarily by males, and they function to regulate
intra-male relations.
The issue of practical importance is whether Title VII should reach
practices that do not target women but that impair the average woman’s
performance. Virtually all courts have taken the view that disparate
treatment doctrine does not bar any work policy or conduct directed evenhandedly to male and female employees.198 Only one circuit court (the
Ninth, of course) has taken a different approach. In EEOC v. National
Education Association (NEA), Alaska, the defendant was a teacher’s
197. The statutory text is quite clear: since the Civil Rights Act of 1991, “an unlawful
employment practice is established when the complaining party demonstrates that race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor for any employment practice,
even though other factors also motivated the practice.” Civil Rights Act of 1991, S. 1745,
102d Cong. §107 (1991) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.§2000e-2(m) (2012)). Gelbach,
Klick, and Wexler reach a different conclusion, suggesting that “as currently conceived,
disparate treatment claims seemingly do not prohibit the employer from using group-based
characteristics . . . to treat individuals similarly in hopes that such treatment will encourage
applicants from disfavored groups to sort themselves out of a job.” Gelbach et al., supra
note 178, at 833. Their principal support for this is a 1993 opinion by Judge Richard
Posner, which indeed supports their claim. EEOC v. Consolidated Serv. Sys., 989 F.3d 233
(7th Cir. 1993). However, the years at issue were prior to the Civil Right Act of 1991, and
as authority Posner cites Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 242 (1989), which
does tend to preclude any liability, but is now superseded by statute.
Gelbach, Klick, and Wexler also argue that employers may use group characteristics to
discourage the disfavored group in the more specific situation where the discrimination
takes the form of a benefits or compensation policy. Gelbach et al., supra note 178, at 828.
In Arizona Governing Committee for Tax Deferred Annuity & Deferred Compensation
Plans v. Norris, 463 U.S. 1073, 1086, 1089–91 (1983), the Supreme Court found in
violation of Title VII a plan that required sex-differentiated contributions to compensate for
women’s greater longevity. See also City of L.A. Dep’t of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435
U.S. 702, 712 (1978) (invalidating a plan that required women to make equal contributions
but receive lower benefits). Gelbach, Klick, and Wexler suggest correctly that the effect of
Norris and Manhart was tacitly to approve a plan that was facially neutral but provided
higher net benefits to women, and argue that Manhart and Norris “foreclose[] the avenue of
pursuing passive discrimination claims as disparate treatment in fringe benefits or
compensation.” Gelbach et al., supra note 178, at 828. But in neither Norris nor Manhart
was there any suggestion that the plan had been instituted with the purpose of discriminating
against either women or men. Faced with evidence of intent to discriminate and a neutrally
framed plan with a discriminatory effect, a court would almost surely find disparate
treatment.
198. A rare exception to this principle is dress codes. See, e.g., Jespersen v. Harrah’s
Operating Co., 444 F.3d 1104 (2006).
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union.199 One supervisor, Thomas Harvey, frequently “yelled”200 and
“screamed”201 at employees in a hostile manner, often without
provocation.202 On only one occasion did Harvey actually touch an
employee, grabbing her shoulders and yelling that she should get back to
her office.203 However, both male and female employees testified that they
perceived his behavior as physically threatening to themselves or to others.
He frequently invaded employees’ personal space, sometimes lunging and
shaking his fist.204 The record is not entirely clear about whether Harvey’s
conduct was different towards men and women.205 What is clear, however,
is that their response differed. One female employee filed a police report
expressing her concerns about the possibility of assault,206 and many
witnesses agreed that the women in the office felt “in jeopardy” and
“physically threatened” most of the time.207 In contrast, although one male
employee testified that on one occasion Harvey once “scared the hell out
of” him, men in general were far more comfortable with Harvey’s
conduct.208
A difference in Harvey’s conduct towards men and women would
clearly have constituted disparate treatment. The Ninth Circuit, however,
went further. It had already held that harassment of an explicitly sexual—
in the sense of erotic—nature should be evaluated from the perspective of
the victim, and that the average woman might be disturbed by sexual
behavior that did not disturb the average man.209 In NEA, Alaska, it
extended that holding to non-sexual abusive behavior, holding that even if
the abuser treats both sexes identically, a different subjective response by
one sex can give rise to a disparate treatment claim.210

199. EEOC v. Nat’l Educ. Ass’n (NEA), Alaska, 422 F.3d 840, 842 (9th Cir. 2005). That
the defendant was a teacher's union is itself a striking fact, since few professions are more
female dominated than teaching.
200. Id. at 843.
201. Id. at 844.
202. Id. at 843.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 846.
206. Id. at 843.
207. Id. Bhend testified that Harvey’s behavior at her evaluation meeting put her in a
“state of panic,” that she “felt that [she] was in jeopardy,” and that she felt “physically
threatened most of the time.” Id. Indeed, Bhend went so far as to omit submission of a
number of her overtime hours because she “was too scared of Mr. Harvey to turn them in to
him.” Chamara also testified that Harvey created a general atmosphere of intimidation in
the workplace that was “like working with a ticking time bomb because you’re sitting by
and you’re waiting for your turn to be next.” Jeff Cloutier testified, without prompting, to
the “general fear of the women at our office.” Id. at 843–44.
208. Id. at 846.
209. Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 879 (9th Cir. 1991).
210. NEA Alaska, 422 F.3d at 845–46. The Ninth Circuit reaffirmed this rule in Davis v.
California Department of Corrections & Rehabilitation, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 11399, at
*6, *8 (9th Cir. June 6, 2012).
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The Ninth Circuit rule stretches the limit of what can properly be called
disparate treatment. A practice that is adopted without discriminatory
intent and administered with an even albeit abusive hand seems by
definition not to raise a disparate treatment claim, even if it hurts one sex
more than the other. Admittedly, the proper boundaries between disparate
impact and disparate treatment remain complex and controversial,211 but
several policy other concerns suggest that disparate impact is a more
appropriate theory. Discrimination law reflects not one but several
different normative principles. At its core is the proposition variously
known as formal equality or the neutrality principle: employment decisions
cannot be made because of the employee’s membership in a protected
class.212 As George Rutherglen has argued, only the neutrality principle
commands essentially unanimous support in American society and it is the
foundation on which the political legitimacy of discrimination law rests.
The neutrality principle finds its fullest expression in disparate treatment
doctrine, and disparate impact doctrine can be justified on neutrality
grounds only to the extent that it is used as a means of smoking out
intentional discrimination.213 Much of disparate impact law extends
beyond the neutrality principle to embrace principles of substantive
equality. These principles command less consensus than the neutrality
principle,214 and because violations of them seem less morally
blameworthy,215 the damages available in disparate impact suits are far less
extensive than those available in disparate treatment cases.216 Limited
damages serve pragmatic purposes as well: They reduce the costs of
211. Rutherglen, Essentially Contested Concept of Equality, supra note 189, at 2325.
212. Id.
213. George Rutherglen, Disparate Impact Under Title VII: An Objective Theory of
Discrimination, 73 VA. L. REV. 1297, 1299–1311 (1987) [hereinafter Rutherglen, Disparate
Impact Under Title VII].
214. Rutherglen, Essentially Contested Concept of Equality, supra note 189; Rutherglen,
Disparate Impact Under Title VII, supra note 213.
215. David Benjamin Oppenheimer, Negligent Discrimination, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 899,
971 (1993); Melissa Hart, The Possibility of Avoiding Discrimination: Considering
Compliance and Liability, 39 CONN. L. REV. 1623, 1647–48 (2007) (liability inappropriate
for defendants who adopt best practices that prove less than fully effective); Linda Hamilton
Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrimination and
Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161, 1243–46 (1995) (recommending
two-tier liability, with limitations on damages when no conscious intent to discriminate
proved); Charles A. Sullivan, Disparate Impact: Looking Past the Desert Palace Mirage, 47
WM. & MARY L. REV. 911, 983–84, 1001–02 (2005) (proposing modified disparate impact
and noting its similarity to Oppenheimer’s proposal); Noah D. Zatz, Managing the Macaw:
Third-Party Harassers, Accommodation, and the Disaggregation of Discriminatory Intent,
109 COLUM. L. REV. 1357, 1436–39 (2009).
216. For disparate impact cases, the original provisions of the 1964 Act were retained and
monetary damages were limited to certain kinds of back pay. The Civil Rights Act of 1991
provided for compensatory and punitive damages against a defendant who engaged in
“unlawful intentional discrimination (not an employment practice that is unlawful because
of its disparate impact).” Civil Rights Act of 1991, S. 1745, 102d Cong. § 1977A (1991)
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.§ 1981a(a)(1) (2012)).
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admitting liability, encourage settlement and actively engage employers in
the redesign of personnel policies to reduce future discrimination.217
Liability for neutral but violent work cultures falls outside not only the
narrow definition of disparate treatment but its broader purposes. A
doctrine of discriminatory work culture that embodies a vision of equality
based on difference will not command the same consensus as one based on
the neutrality principle. Placing violations of a difference-based principle
in the same class as violations of neutrality risks popular and judicial
support for discrimination law.
At the same time, disparate impact theory seems well-suited to attack
physically abusive environments. A key aim of disparate impact liability is
to reduce unnecessary obstacles to the success of protected groups,218 and
carefully limited use of disparate impact doctrine to limit violent work
cultures seems to further this goal.219 Damage limitations may reduce
judicial and political resistance to a novel theory, and encourage the
employer cooperation that is critical when the behavior to be deterred may
be hard to monitor and prevent.
Only a small fraction of abusive work cultures can be reached by
disparate impact doctrine, and for this reason Kerri Lynn Stone has
advocated regulating abuse at work not by Title VII, but by a sex-neutral
statute.220 Although she makes a powerful argument that broader sexneutral regulation would be useful,221 a narrow Title VII cause of action is
important to establish that the accommodation of differences is a
permissible goal of Title VII. Recent developments in the law threaten to
limit voluntary employer changes to make work cultures more femalefriendly.222 Even circumscribed disparate impact liability for work cultures
can be used to establish the legitimacy of actions designed to take into
account statistical sex differences in personality.
4. The Lack of Interest Defense and the Relevant Labor Market
Evidence of sex differences already has a place in the law of disparate
treatment. In a systemic disparate treatment suit, the plaintiff must show
that the defendant has a policy, pattern, or practice of discriminating

217. Two other provisions further the remedial purpose of the statute. In both disparate
impact and disparate treatment cases, courts have broad injunctive powers and prevailing
parties may obtain attorney’s fees and costs. Civil Rights Act of 1964, H.R. 7152, 88th
Cong. § 706(g) (1964) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e(g), (k)).
218. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971).
219. For proposal to apply disparate impact doctrine to a broader range of masculine work
cultures, see Case, supra note 148, at 78–95.
220. See generally Kerri Lynn Stone, From Queen Bees and Wannabes to Worker Bees:
Why Gender Considerations Should Inform the Emerging Law of Workplace Bullying, 65
N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 35 (2009).
221. Countervailing reasons to limit the legal system's intrusion into work culture are
discussed in Section V.A.2.
222. See Section V.
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against a protected group.223 To do this, plaintiffs almost always224 provide
statistical evidence that the proportion of a protected class in the
employer’s workforce is significantly different from the “qualified . . .
population in the relevant labor market.”225
The relevant labor market should reflect the set of choices truly
available to the employer and must include only people who are both
qualified and interested.226 The relevant market can be defined broadly
(retail sales personnel generally) or narrowly (those selling a particular line
of merchandise or those on commission). Typically the more narrowly
defined labor market contains a lower proportion of protected class
members and plaintiffs will argue for a broader definition, claiming that the
narrow characterization simply perpetuates market-wide discrimination.
Defendants respond that a broad market definition fails to allow for actual
differences in the qualifications and interests of men and women.227 Views
on discrimination and difference thus always lurk in the background when
choices are made among various labor market definitions.228
A defendant is said to raise a lack of interest defense if its principal
challenge to the plaintiff’s statistics focuses on women’s ostensible lack of
interest in the jobs at issue. Like most defendants who rely on this theory,
Sears introduced a wide array of expert witnesses, some of whom provided
what would now be called “social framework evidence”229 of the different
preferences of men and women in society as a whole. A prominent
feminist historian, Professor Rosalind Rosenberg, testified in support of

223. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977). Strictly speaking,
“pattern or practice” suits are suits brought by the United States government under section
707 of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-6 (2012). However, class actions by private plaintiffs
are for most purposes equivalent to “pattern or practice” suits through the use of class
actions. Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747 (1976). In these cases, plaintiffs
usually also provide individual class members who describe their experiences of
discrimination by the employer. A plaintiff may prevail through statistics alone if the
discrepancies are sufficiently extreme. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S.
299, 307–08 (1977). But individual testimony brings “the cold numbers convincingly to
life.” Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 339. The EEOC in Sears failed to introduce such
evidence, and this omission was one of many errors that doomed its case. Sears III, 839
F.2d 302, 310 (7th Cir. 1988).
224. Statistical evidence is not an absolute requirement in systemic disparate treatment
cases. Pitre v. Western Elec. Co., F.2d 1262, 1267 (10th Cir. 1988).
225. Hazelwood Sch. Dist., 433 U.S. at 308.
226. See generally RAMONA L. PAETZOLD & STEVEN L. WILLBORN, THE STATISTICS OF
DISCRIMINATION: USING STATISTICAL EVIDENCE IN DISCRIMINATION CASES § 4.3 (2007).
227. Perhaps only actual applicant data, reduced to exclude the unqualified, should be
used. This option does not eliminate the problem of background assumptions though.
Using actual applicant data will eliminate members of the pool with no interest in the job
but it may exclude some who are interested if the employer’s history of discrimination
dissuaded members of the protected class from even applying.
228. Deborah M. Weiss, The Impossibility of Agnostic Discrimination Law, 2011 UTAH L.
REV. 1677, 1737–39.
229. The concept was first introduced in Laurens Walker & John Monahan, Social
Frameworks: A New Use of Social Science in Law, 73 VA. L. REV. 559 (1987).
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Sears’ claim that women are uncomfortable with the competitive
atmosphere of commission selling.230 An expert on polling data examined
national surveys and polls and concluded than women were less interested
in jobs with financial risk or involving a high degree of competition among
salespersons.231 Witnesses for the EEOC countered that the evidence did
not support the view that significant differences existed between the
interests and career aspirations of men and women: women’s different
career paths, they argued, were the result of limited opportunities rather
than different preferences.232
Cases in which defendants rely primarily on a lack of interest defense
were once common233 but have become less so.234 The Sears opinion
created a furor,235 and subsequent defendants may have decided that raising
the defense explicitly was imprudent. The question of lack of interest lives
on, though somewhat under the radar, in the reports of defense expert
witnesses on the proper definition of the qualified workforce.236 Plaintiffs
typically respond that the lack of interest argument promotes stereotypes.237
The “stereotype promotion” argument has not fared well with courts, which
typically regard evidence of lack of interest as relevant.238 Plaintiffs might
do better to acknowledge that statistical sex differences exist while
challenging the traditional characterization of those differences. For the
most part, employers have no obligation to change their work cultures to
meet the needs of women, but they should be challenged if they claim, as
Sears did, that they could not do so because their cultures reflect intrinsic
job characteristics. The trier of fact may well defer to an employer who
argues that that changing practices to help women would drastically lower
the productivity of male workers. But fact-finders might also conclude that

230. Sears II, 628 F. Supp. 1264, 1308 (N.D. Ill. 1986).
231. Id.
232. Id. at 1314 nn.61–63.
233. Schultz, Telling Stories About Women and Work, supra note 3, at 1776 (finding
forty-three published lack of interest cases between 1978 and 1989); Vicki Schultz &
Stephen Petterson, Race, Gender, Work, and Choice: An Empirical Study of the Lack of
Interest Defense in Title VII Cases Challenging Job Segregation, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 1073,
1095 (1992).
234. Neil Dishman, Defending the Lack of Interest Defense: Why the Title VII Should
Recognize Differing Job Interests Between the Sexes, 14 GEO. MASON U. C.R. L.J. 189, 190
n.3 (2004) (finding only seven published lack of interest cases between 1991 and 2004).
235. See, e.g., Schultz, Telling Stories About Women and Work, supra note 3, at 1753;
Joan C. Williams, Dissolving the Sameness/Difference Debate: A Post-Modern Path Beyond
Essentialism in Feminist and Critical Race Theory, 1991 DUKE L.J. 296, 297 (1991);
Haskell & Levinson, supra note 69.
236. Ellis v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 240 F.R.D. 627, 638 (N.D. Cal. 2007) (Dr.
Margaret Stockdale and Dr. Casey Mulligan on women’s lack of interest in relevant job);
EEOC v. Morgan Stanley, 324 F. Supp. 2d 451, 465 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (Dr. June O’Neill on
lack of interest).
237. Morgan Stanley, 324 F. Supp. 2d at 465.
238. Id.; Ellis, 240 F.R.D. at 638.
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this failure to change was part of a larger pattern of intentional
discrimination or that accommodation costs were not that high.239
A more nuanced response to the lack of interest defense would improve
plaintiffs’ chances of prevailing, and would also serve purposes perhaps
even more important. The limits of our present scientific knowledge as
well as the unsettled status of scientific evidence in the courts caution
against the widespread use of disparate impact theory to challenge work
cultures. Incremental improvements may produce work cultures congenial
to women and make legal intervention unnecessary. But if that does not
come to pass, a more aggressive use of disparate impact would be helped
by an established body of evidence and doctrine on sex differences, and
lack of interest suits today can lay the foundation for this.
B. VOLUNTARY EMPLOYER ACTS
Judicial edict cannot be the main mechanism for making workplaces
more congenial to women. Ultimately, the voluntary actions of employers
must be the main engine of change. Such voluntary efforts, however,
might be challenged by male workers. As part of its effort to attract more
women to commission sales, Sears reduced the proportion of compensation
attributable to commissions. Suppose a highly successful male salesperson
challenged this change as discrimination against men. On its face, such a
claim seems absurd, yet at present it stands some chance of succeeding.
1. Ricci v. DeStefano
Until recently there was no reason to think that the law would place
any obstacles in the way of employer efforts to make workplaces friendlier
to women. This changed after the 2009 case Ricci v. DeStefano,240 in
which the Supreme Court considered a decision by the City of New Haven
not to certify the results of a fire department promotional exam after whites
and Hispanics passed at a much higher rate than blacks. After reviewing
the facts, Justice Kennedy announced what has been called the Ricci
premise241: “Our analysis begins with this premise: The City’s actions
would violate the disparate-treatment prohibition of Title VII absent some
valid defense.”242 The City of New Haven claimed that its fear of disparate
impact liability constituted such a defense, and the Supreme Court held that
such fear could not justify the City’s action unless it had a “strong-basis-inevidence.”243

239. See Green, supra note 4, at 664 (suggesting a similarly modest role for lack of
interest doctrine in addressing the problems of work culture).
240. Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557 (2009).
241. Richard Primus, The Future of Disparate Impact, 108 MICH. L. REV. 1341, 1343
(2009).
242. Ricci, 557 U.S. at 579.
243. Id. at 582.
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The Ricci court refers to the City’s action as “race-conscious,”244 and
interpreted broadly, the Ricci premise classifies as disparate treatment any
decision to modify a practice that considers the effect of the practice on a
protected group. However, Title VII only prohibits action taken “because
of” protected status, and action that is “race-conscious” might not be taken
“because of” race. Suppose an employer notices that practice has a
disparate impact and is thus motivated to examine the practice more
carefully. Upon closer examination the practice appears flawed wholly
apart from its disparate impact. The disparate impact has served as a
diagnostic tool that motivated the employer to find some more general
problem with the practice. The decision to change the practice is thus not
“because of” race or sex, but because of other problems with the practice.
Language in the opinion supports this narrower reading.245
Interpreting the Ricci premise narrowly to apply only when there is
strict causation expands somewhat the options available to employers. If
the City’s search for the cause of the racial disparity uncovered widespread
cheating, the City would surely have been free, even obligated, to throw out
the test. Even in Ricci, closer examination of the test at issue revealed a
number of flaws from a wholly non-racial perspective. In making its case,
the City chose not to emphasize these flaws,246 and so its action was
susceptible to characterization as purely race-conscious.
Yet a strict causation requirement in the Ricci premise may not help an
employer who wishes to voluntarily restructure its work practices to make
them more congenial to women. The disparate impact that a competitive
environment has on women is not diagnostic of a general flaw in such
environments, which may well be optimal for men. Statistical sex
differences imply unavoidable trade-offs, and some forms of restructuring
intended to help women will hurt men.247 An employer who changes a
practice to help women will sometimes be acting strictly “because of” sex.
Sears made it perfectly clear that changes in its commission structure were
motivated by a desire to increase the number of women in its commission
sales force, and that admission seems to trigger the Ricci premise.

244. Ricci, 557 U.S. at 581, 585.
245. “Title VII does not prohibit an employer from considering, before administering a
test or practice, how to design that test or practice in order to provide a fair opportunity for
all individuals, regardless of their race.” Id. at 585.
246. George Rutherglen, Ricci v. DeStefano: Affirmative Action and the Lessons of
Adversity, 2009 SUP. CT. REV. 83, 88 (2009). The City did not even argue that the test was
invalid, only that it might be found to be invalid. Ricci, 557 U.S. at 585. To put it bluntly,
the City was apparently too proud to admit it might have administered a bad test.
247. Such trade-offs are not unique to changes to allow for sex differences, and at least
until Ricci, employers had been permitted or even required to make changes that deviated
from a purely meritocratic ideal. J. Hoult Verkerke, Disaggregating Antidiscrimination and
Accommodation, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1385, 1401 (2003) (citing Christine Jolls,
Antidiscrimination and Accommodation, 115 HARV. L. REV. 642, 694 (2001)).
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To avoid invalidating such changes, those of us sympathetic to
workplace restructuring may be inclined to see a problem in the Ricci
premise itself and to propose that it be further limited. But the Ricci
premise is not clearly wrong. Suppose Sears had increased the amount of
compensation attributable to commissions with the conscious purpose of
increasing the proportion of males. Presumably this would constitute
disparate treatment absent some defense. If the only difference between a
pro-male and pro-female change is whose ox is being gored, then both
cases are properly labeled disparate treatment though only one is a potential
candidate for some defense.
But which defense? I argued earlier that disparate impact doctrine
should be used only sparingly to attack work cultures that disadvantage
women. As a result, employers adopting a female-friendly work culture
will seldom have a “strong-basis-in-evidence” for expecting liability. By
far the most important alternative possible defense is that the challenged
acts are legitimate affirmative action.
2. Affirmative Action
In spirit, Ricci is an affirmative action case.248 The opinion notes the
importance of safeguarding the rights of workers outside the protected
class, and affirmative action doctrine is the only part of Title VII law that
provides a coherent framework for thinking about this problem.
Doctrinally, however, Ricci is not an affirmative action case. The issue of
affirmative action was not raised by the City and the only opinion that
mentions it (briefly) is Justice Ginsburg’s dissent.249 Affirmative action
doctrine thus remains intact as a potential defense when employer acts are
characterized as disparate treatment under the Ricci premise.
The case law of affirmative action has primarily examined numerical
goals, although the term “affirmative action” in theory encompasses many
steps that an employer might voluntarily take to increase the numbers of
historically underrepresented groups in its workforce. The last time the
Supreme Court addressed this issue under Title VII was in the 1987 case
Johnson v. Transportation Agency, Santa Clara County.250 Elaborating on
the earlier United Steelworkers of America v. Weber,251 Johnson upheld the
employer’s plan on the grounds that it had four characteristics. First, the

248. Ricci, 557 U.S. at 626 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
249. Id. Justice Ginsburg’s Ricci dissent simply asserted without analysis that “if the
voluntary affirmative action at issue in Johnson does not discriminate within the meaning of
Title VII, neither does an employer’s reasonable effort to comply with Title VII’s disparateimpact provision by refraining from action of doubtful consistency with business necessity.”
Id. On closer examination the explicit application of affirmative action doctrine might have
helped the City somewhat, but, as the rest of this section will discuss, perhaps not as much
as Justice Ginsberg implied.
250. Johnson v. Transp. Agency, Santa Clara Cnty., 480 U.S. 616 (1987).
251. United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
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plan was “consistent with Title VII’s objective of ‘[breaking] down old
patterns of racial segregation and hierarchy.’”252 Second, the plan sought to
remedy a “manifest imbalance” resulting from historical discrimination,253
although there was no evidence of discrimination on the employer’s part.254
Third, the plan did not unnecessarily trammel the rights of male employees
or create an absolute bar to their advancement.255 Fourth, the plan was
temporary, intended to eliminate imbalance rather than to maintain
balance.256
Most work culture changes do not unnecessarily trammel the rights of
other employees. They erect no absolute bar to advancement, and under
both disparate treatment and disparate impact the establishment of work
culture is, unlike hiring and promotion, generally within an employer’s
prerogatives. Few courts would regard a change in Sears commission
policies as the equivalent of a numerical goal.
Johnson also requires a “manifest imbalance” in the work force.257 The
Johnson court emphasized that the discrepancy need not be enough to
constitute a prima facie statistical case,258 but how much less the
discrepancy may be is far from clear. In practice, affirmative action plans
that have been upheld usually involve discrepancies that are relatively close
to the prima facie case level.259 Johnson may thus not give employers all
252. Johnson, 480 U.S. at 628 (quoting United Steelworkers of Am., 443 U.S. at 195).
253. Johnson, 480 U.S. at 631. See also United Steelworkers of Am., 443 U.S. at 197
(“manifest racial imbalance”).
254. Johnson, 480 U.S. at 632.
255. Id. at 630 (quoting United Steelworkers of Am., 443 U.S. at 208).
256. Johnson, 480 U.S. at 630 (quoting United Steelworkers of Am., 443 U.S. at 208).
The affirmative action framework helps explain two otherwise puzzling aspects of the Ricci
opinion: the critical role played by the City’s decision to discard the test after it was
administered, and the burden that a second test would have placed on plaintiffs who had
already invested significant time and money in study. Neither the timing of the decision nor
the size of the resulting harm seems relevant to whether the City’s decision constituted
intentional discrimination. Both are, however, clearly relevant to affirmative action
analysis, specifically to whether the employer’s action unnecessarily trammeled the rights of
other workers. The Court was evidently incorporating affirmative action reasoning without
saying so, and clear articulation of this would have sensibly narrowed the practical effect of
Ricci while protecting the interests of all employees. Contrary to Justice Ginsburg’s
suggestion, had New Haven asserted an affirmative action defense in Ricci, its actions might
still have been invalidated because they unnecessarily trammeled the rights of plaintiffs by
imposing a second set of preparation costs. I believe that Justice Ginsburg made a serious
and somewhat uncharacteristic strategic mistake in focusing entirely on the reasons that
Ricci itself should have come out differently. The goal of a future narrow interpretation
would have been better served by a dissent or even a concurrence that focused in more detail
on affirmative action principles and stressed how they should operate to limit the Ricci
principles.
257. Johnson, 480 U.S. at 631. See also United Steelworkers of Am., 443 U.S. at 197
(“manifest racial imbalance”).
258. Johnson, 480 U.S. at 632.
259. See, e.g., United States v. N.Y.C. Bd. of Educ., 448 F. Supp. 2d 397, 425–26
(E.D.N.Y. 2006); Honadle v. Univ. of Vt. & State Ag. Coll., 56 F. Supp. 2d 419, 426 (D. Vt.
1999).
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that much more latitude than Ricci.260 To be sure, a plaintiff who proves a
prima facie statistical case can only prevail with either additional proof of
intent or the absence of job-relatedness, and Johnson permits affirmative
action when these other two requirements are not met. Still, the manifest
imbalance test seems unduly stringent when work culture changes rather
than numerical goals are at issue.
A third prong of the Johnson analysis requires that affirmative action
be temporary,261 a rule that makes some sense for numerical goals, since
permanent numerical goals clearly contravene the spirit of nondiscrimination. However, policy considerations suggest that there is no
reason to make work culture changes temporary and every reason to expect
that some of them should be permanent. The inherently lower burden of
work culture changes on those outside the protected class can be seen as a
justification for the dilution or abandonment of the Johnson requirements
that sex-conscious changes be temporary and in response to a manifest
imbalance.
Finally, Johnson requires that a plan be “consistent with Title VII’s
objective of ‘[breaking] down old patterns of racial segregation and
hierarchy.’”262 That affirmative action be consistent with the goals of Title
VII seems fair enough. That those goals be conceived entirely in terms of
integration is less clear. The inclusion of race and sex in the same statute
may have been unfortunate; in this regard the flexibility of the sliding
constitutional standard would have been preferable. Some recognition of
personality differences in disparate impact theory would give a foothold in
Title VII to the principle that such differences may be recognized without
doing unacceptable damage to neutrality principles. Perhaps it would be
better to require that any change be consistent with Title VII’s objective of
achieving a more equitable workplace for women.

VI. CONCLUSION
Since its passage, courts and commentators have typically
characterized Title VII as requiring no more and no less than the neutral
treatment of men and women. Neutrality has much to recommend it as a
normative principle and for many years the neutrality paradigm served
women well as a legal strategy.
A requirement of neutrality, however, might take several forms. The
law might permit any neutral employment practice, whether or not it is
more congenial on average to members of one sex. Such strong neutrality
principles tend to perpetuate the male-oriented status quo.
260. Unlike Ricci however, a Johnson defense does not require any showing of a possible
causal relationship between the observed discrepancy and the practice that the employer
wishes to change.
261. Johnson, 480 U.S. at 630 (quoting United Steelworkers of Am., 443 U.S. at 208).
262. Johnson, 480 U.S. at 628 (quoting United Steelworkers of Am., 443 U.S. at 195).
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Alternatively, the law might limit the range of permissible neutral
practices, excluding at least some that excessively favor traits typically
associated with one sex or the other. This gender-conscious neutrality must
inevitably rest on some vision of which traits are gendered and how
persistent sex differences are likely to be. Central to developing potential
limits is the study of empirical evidence on differences between men and
women. Advocating gender-conscious rules that emphasize the ethic of
care may invite the response, “Well, then, maybe you belong at home with
your children.” The empirical difference model suggests that sex
differences are not arrayed on a simple continuum of care and competition,
and that accommodation may require modulation rather than radical
restructuring of work practices such as commission schemes.
Translating strong neutrality into a policy agenda is relatively
straightforward, and much of the appeal of strong neutrality is its simple
clarity. Gender-conscious neutrality will look clumsy and complex in
comparison. Yet evasion of the issue of sex differences has led to the
stagnation in Title VII doctrine, as courts rightly observe that strong
neutrality does not imply the relief requested by plaintiffs. The quest for
alternatives to strong neutrality is not an easy one, and must evolve along
with our changing understanding of statistical sex differences. The
development of alternative principles must therefore proceed slowly and
cautiously, one small step at a time. In this article I have proposed a few
such steps: a new response to the lack-of-interest defense; a reform of
principles of affirmative action as applied to non-numerical actions, and the
tentative introduction into disparate impact doctrine of evidence of sex
differences. Only experience can suggest what might follow after this.
Perhaps employment law has reached a limit, and the problem of work
culture can best be addressed by policies outside of employment law.
Male-friendly work cultures developed in firms founded by men, and
perhaps female-friendly work cultures will fully flourish only when more
firms are founded by women.

